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ABSTRACT
Alternative Media: Commodification and 
the Vexing Coordinates of Alterity 
Cyrus Lewis
 The deleterious effects of commodification on media content, particularly of an 
oppositional or politically committed nature, that is, media often classified under the 
rubric “alternative,” is well documented. This thesis attempts to wrestle with this puzzle 
and to unpack some of alternative media’s more curious attributes; i.e., the frustrating 
truth that alterity is a relational phenomenon, more sensitive to the vagaries and caprices 
of the market than its desire for autonomy would indicate; the profound fact that it is not 
so “alternative” as it seems to presuppose, as evidenced in its periodic reinvigoration of 
the markets of “popular culture;” and the intriguing point that its aspirations, more often 
than not, appear to cohere with mass culture’s lionization of individuality. At the heart of 
this paradox is a yearning for that nebulous characteristic of “authenticity.” That 
narratives of authenticity attend most instantiations of alterity and alternative media is no 
accident. But authenticity itself is as bound up with the ascension of capitalist modernity 
and the liberal public sphere as are notions of alterity. By examining alterity, with an eye 
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 Alternative Media labors in the shadow of commodification. This is nowhere more 
obvious than in the fact that writing about alternative media necessitates a discussion of 
commodification. Alternative media’s alterity is relational: It defines itself in contrast 
with “mass culture,” which, generally speaking it abhors or attempts to defy. The central 
question that this thesis is ultimately concerned with exploring is how processes of 
commodification are experienced and/or navigated by cultural producers whose bailiwick 
is imagined to be “alternative.”  What options do cultural producers of alternative media 
have in the face of ever more rapid and pervasive commodification? Can creative practice 
still engender political possibilities? Does the oftentimes opprobrious material of alterity 
ultimately do more damage than good (i.e., What can be said of the value, paid to 
transgression in the denomination of cultural attention, in narratives of cultural 
resistance)?
 This research is not concerned with the resistant consumer, a figure whose presence 
often attends discussions of oppositional culture. If the profusion of choice and the 
superficially subversive in popular culture is sufficient to undermine some of the claims 
of the possibility of resistance in reception -- in that popular culture becomes a surrogate 
for politics while putting a gloss on power relations -- it seems advantageous to discuss 
these selfsame issues as they relate to the production end of the cycle of production. My 
research, in this respect, is rooted in a Marxist orientation. Moreover, a running 
supposition of this thesis, mapped out explicitly in my discussion of commodity fetishism 
in Chapter 3, stems from Marx’s most central criticism of labour under capitalism. This 
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criticism maintains that labour does not, in fact, exist separately from labourers and that 
putting labour into the market as a commodity ensures that the web of social relations 
between labourers are subjected to market vagaries, which in turn has a pernicious effect 
on social fabrics (Marx, 1906). Commodity fetishism, which grants the value of human 
relations to things, implies that subjects are already implicated in the system of social 
relations they wish to criticize. This insight undergirds the observation that, under 
monopoly capitalism, cultural production can easily be recuperated in such a way as to 
aestheticize politics (Benjamin, 1968) and that under contemporary capitalism, 
oppositional cultural production can be recuperated in the same way. Benjamin’s 
observations about Nazi rallies and affective appeals -- the aestheticization of politics  -- 
are perhaps responsible for the popular opinion of the political left that the inverse, that 
is, the politicization of aesthetics, packs some resistant punch. But while some argument 
may be mustered for the fact that political aesthetics were deeply implicated in the social 
movement of the 60s, there can be no doubt now that this selfsame radical impulse 
reanimates a frequently moribund pop culture market (invigorating the cultural 
marketplace belonging to the “one-dimensional man” of 1950s suburbia). This market 
valorization of transgression recuperates the oppositional impulse ruthlessly. So it is, for 
example, that we find the Palestinian Keffiyah, divorced of its political signification, 
rendered a fashion accessory, much like its more ubiquitous brethren, the omnipresent 
Che Guevara t-shirt, by the new bourgeois 20-something countercultural maven, the 
much-hyped and often maligned “hipster.”
2
 Lest the reader labour under the misapprehension that the forthcoming meditation is 
blinkered by its adherence to Marxist analysis, that is, liable to perseverate on issues of 
production, it is perhaps worthwhile to remember that Marx’s formulation of the model of 
production was dialectical. Production, distribution, exchange and consumption each 
represented a moment in a circuit in which each instance had some modicum of 
determinacy over the other moments. As Stuart Hall notes in his writing on the 
introduction of Marx’s Grundrisse, the (cyclical) relationship of production to 
consumption is threefold: “First, production furnishes consumption with its ‘object.’ 
Second, production specifies the mode in which the object is consumed. But, third, 
production produces the need which its object satisfies” (1974). Anchoring analysis in 
Marxist orientation means that one must necessarily be vigilant about the mobius-strip-
like loop of production. Indeed, the question of reception is repeatedly broached via the 
theoretical apparatuses I have conscripted to wrestle with the manner in which notions of 
alterity are disseminated and understood, i.e., its communicative circuit. Both Thorstein 
Veblen’s theory of invidious comparison and John Durham Peters’ schematic of “abyss-
artistry” and “abyss-redemption” are pivotal mechanisms through which I attempt to 
uncover those forces that are complicit in raising the profile, esteem or seriousness with 
which forms of alternative media are perceived and received by both their producers and 
consumers. Both concepts are mapped out in Chapter 1, wherein I also give summary 
attention to the literature attending alternative media.
 Over the course of my research, I repeatedly ran afoul of notions of “authenticity.” 
Indeed, I discovered that conceptions of alterity almost always accompany invocations of 
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authenticity.  Consequently, interrogations of authenticity attend my inquiry into the 
coordinates of alterity in the forthcoming, culminating, in Chapter 2, in my coining the 
term, “Lokiist-authentic,” which I use to refer to authenticity’s frequenty duplicitous and 
highly contextual character. It is largely because of my eventual reckoning with 
authenticity as a rational desire to evade or combat the estranging forces of commodified 
culture that I attempt to circumvent theories of (all encompassing) ideological 
interpolation and/or hegemony. Opposition to the dominance of capital is, to my mind, 
expressed in the high regard that alterity receives and is consequently far more common 
than is often presupposed. This does not mean, however, that it is not immersed in a 
thicket of problems. All of these issues are brought to bear in Chapter 3 with the example 
of Tactical Media, a contemporary manifestation of alternative media, which is recruited 
as a sort of case study or guinea pig for the theoretical concepts introduced in the first 2 
chapters. Portions of Chapter 3 were originally published, in media res as it were, on 
Jacobin Magazine’s blog.1 They have been significantly modified.
 Joseph Heath has wryly commented on the pitfalls often attached to theoretical 
contortions, observing that “relying upon elaborate theoretical constructions in lieu of 
moral claims ([is a strategy] that violates one of the most fundamental rules of argument, 
viz. that one cannot derive possible conclusions - e.g., workers are badly treated, people 
are sexually repressed -- from anything intrinsically less plausible -- e.g., Hegelian 
dialectics, the struggle for Eros and Thanatos)” (Veblen, 3). I would like to include the 
consideration, however, that elliptical or cater-cornered explorations can result in fertile 
4
1 See: <jacobinmag.com/blog/2011/09/the-anarcho-liberal-considered/> and <jacobinmag.com/blog/
2011/11/the-anarcho-liberal-considered-pt-ii/>
interpretations and that elucidation does not always have to be riveted to the economy of 
formula. I hope that the following, occasionally tangential musings, illuminate at least as 
often than they might confound and that there may be moments of discovery amongst the 




Wrestling with Alternative Media / Oppositional Cultural Production and its 
Buoying of the Rebel Consumer and Status Hierarchy
All aware people of our time 
agree that art can no longer be 
justified as a superior activity, 
or even as  an activity of 
compensation to which one 
could honorably devote oneself.
-- Guy Debord,  “Methods of 
Détournement,” 1956
A: Alternative Media: A Hazy Shade of Wooly Imprecision
 “Alternative media,” my ostensive object of concern, is not easy to delineate or 
explain. It is generally understood to have some connection to “politics of resistance,” but 
given that such politics subsume groups as dissimilar as the far left international anarchist  
collective CrimethInc. and American white supremacist group, Stormfront, appealing to 
unqualified markers of political or social intransigence does not appear to offer much 
clarity. CrimethInc. would take violent umbrage at having any of its works colligated 
with Stormfront literature, even if done in the name of a shared commitment to struggles 
against normativity and domination in, say, an anthology sympathetic to conspiracist 
conceptions of oppression called You are Controlled by Men with Monocles. The fact that 
the term “alternative media” is so easily made a contentious one attests to its shaky 
ontology and equivocal condition or character. Loosely defined, it is cultural production 
that strives to offer an alternative to corporate mass media or government controlled 
media, but, of course, what constitutes this alterity is not easy to determine. Indeed, the 
lion’s share of the forthcoming meditation will wrestle with the characteristics belonging 
to “alterity” and alterity’s peculiar relationship with “authenticity.” Moreover, the term 
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“media” itself, even in its “alternative” iterations, is a deeply imprecise designation. If we 
accept that the extravagant interpretive faculties of humanity have allowed for a world of 
profligate semiosis, then there is really no bounds on what, a medium merely being that 
through which a message may be transmitted, media can be thought to refer to. Of course, 
for clarity’s sake, when we discuss “media” it is often understood to be shorthand for 
“The Media,” that is, the “content generators” of the news and entertainment complex of 
our historical moment. This formulation does play to some discussions of alternative 
media, which I will touch on briefly, as with those factions of alternative media which are 
concerned with acting as correctives for the news media. But while I do not want to 
attempt to make a case for alternative media referring to an ineffable plurality, a move 
that would risk a tumble into nebulousness, I do want to take advantage of the term’s 
heterogeneity so as to discuss its more “artistic” manifestations. Much time and energy 
could be dedicated to belabouring considerations of when and how the Fine Arts ought to 
be differentiated from alternative media.2 To short-circuit this potential problem, I intend 
on discussing alternative media more as a category of antinomian discontent than a 
recognizable configuration. 
 As with pornography -- another equally slippery designation -- I would like to 
argue that alternative media is more determined by its historical context than it is a set of 
7
2 This is arguably due to the rigorous policing of the art world’s borders. Radical art, as a constituent part of 
Fine Art territory, is safeguarded as “autonomous” even if it strives to counteract the superciliousness 
which characterizes the dubious claim of sovereignty in the first place. The art world might allow 
“alternative media” to promulgate its functions and discuss its dinner parties, but it would never deign to 
take shelter under such a dirty proletarian rubric. This is because, as Hito Steyerl notes, “production of art 
presents a mirror image of postdemocratic forms of hypercapitalism that looks set to become the dominant 
political post-Cold War paradigm” (32). Art production is often itself a trojan horse for neoliberal trends. 
Consideration of this phenomenon, in the forthcoming discussion, will be inversely proportionate to the 
attention I give any further distinction between alternative media and art.
formal features or comprised of discernibly stable content or an identifiable essence. Like 
material deemed “obscene,” to which alternative media can oftentimes belong, it is 
easiest to say of it that “I know it when I see it,” than it is to point to a feature belonging 
to it that might not change over time. It is exactly alternative media’s amorphousness that 
I am exploiting when I use the term to point to a panoply of methods, materials and 
activities: In foisting oppositional creative enterprise under the rubric “alternative 
media,” I am knowingly taking advantage of its capaciousness to make it stand in for all 
“Oppositional Cultural Production.” That having been said, I will, on occasion, use this 
more awkward sobriquet (“Oppositional Cultural Production”), and others besides, to 
indicate my objects of discussion. I am aware that there are numerous cultural 
phenomena referred to by the adjective “oppositional” well in excess of my focus of 
interest. It will become obvious, I hope, that the ambit of my subject is distinguished by 
left-leaning, anti-capitalist, so-called “progressive” characteristics and/or gestures of 
dissent that are not stained by cretinous chauvinism. The fact that there also exists 
pernicious and noxious elements -- such as the aforementioned neo-Nazi group, 
Stormfront -- which can be said to labor beneath a heading of “oppositional,” I will leave 
to sociological studies, the passage of time, and a hope for the existence of divine 
requital. I am aware that heaping such disparate forms and content under one monolithic 
rubric risks running afoul of Bernard Miege’s muscular critique of Horkheimer and 
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Adorno’s equally totalizing term, “Culture Industry.”3 Nonetheless, for the discussion at 
hand, and with the aim of broadstrokes purposes in mind, alternative media will subsume 
all other categories of cultural production that I may here consider. 
 While it may be true that the term “alternative media” is itself very recent, so too 
is the fact that it has harbingers dating back, at least, to the early 19th century and the 
Romantic idea of the rebellious artist. To seek forebears prior to this point is certainly not 
impossible, but I would argue that alternative media is most recognizable as a species of 
cultural production after the advent of industrial capitalism and the rise of the bourgeoise 
and public sphere. Consequently, to find ancestors dating back before the 18th century, 
one would likely be examining family members in more a spiritual sense than a genetic 
one. In any case, it will not here be possible to delve too deeply into the genealogy of 
alternative media, unfortunately, though I will examine some of its lineage shortly. 
Suffice it to say for the interim that its myriad forms speak, in part, to its contingent and 
querulous nature: the development of alternative media in many ways can be seen to 
chart the changes in political and cultural opposition to oppressive or dominant forms of 
governance and/or the dominative forces of capital. Consequently, much alternative 
media, like comedy, does not retain much potency when it is past its due date. One 
generation’s “alternative media” may form the next’s stockpile of material for mordant 
humour, as with Millennial’s ironic appropriation of 1980s New Wave futurism or the late 
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3 In The Capitalization of Cultural Production Miege argues that the totalizing designation of the “culture 
industry” overlooked the fact that cultural production is actually the result of culture industries. The 
inattention paid to the different logics of production belonging to disparate industries of culture -- e.g., 
broadcasting being wholly dissimilar to print -- is due to Horkheimer and Adorno’s focus on the market 
itself. Miege is probably right that this effectively meant that their critique was thereby inadvertently 
framed by the functioning of market values. Be that as it may, the term “culture industry” retains a critical 
savoir-faire and is undeniably useful in referring to capitalist media writ large. 
1970s’ gleeful defilement of sacred cows from the hippie era. From the leafletting and 
socialist magazines of the turn of the century to today’s enthusiasm for “culture-
jamming,” tactical media4 and digital activism, alternative media has changed drastically 
over the course of the 20th century in nature, character and form. Alongside this 
development has been concomitant anxiety and critique about the effectiveness, 
salubriousness and autonomy of alternative media, in both academic and creative spheres. 
What I am describing here is the tension that exists between cultural production and 
incorporation by the market. Essentially, this anxiety and critique boils down to concerns 
about the effects of commodification on alternative media, although it may not always be 
discussed in these terms. Because alternative media represents an incorrigible rejection of 
authority -- contumaciousness arguably being alternative media’s one constant -- it is 
impossible to adequately describe or discuss it without recourse to the antagonism that 
exists between it and the cash nexus. To discuss alternative media then is to discuss 
commodification. Although I will proceed to a more thorough discussion of 
commodification in the next chapter, its interrelation with alternative media is so 
extensive -- it is like some Siamese Hyrda -- that I cannot help but discuss it in this 
chapter as well; it is the yang to alternative media’s yin (or vice versa).
 The tension between “mass culture” and the oppositional nature of alternative 
media may be far more complicated than is often presupposed, insofar as the latter 
periodically reinvigorates the former; nonetheless, the market’s assimilation of alternative 
media’s heterodoxy and transgressive productions cannot be denied. In fact, it is arguably  
10
4 Methodologies that, as of this writing, may be losing some of their vogue to the game changer that is 
Occupy Wall Street (OWS). See chapter 3.
a readily understood part of the process of artistic production, made most visible by the 
music industry. Thanks to the enormous success of “dangerous” 70s arena rock and roll, 
mass culture has witnessed first hand the incorporation of disaffection. The turgid 
rebellion of Led Zeppelin-esque arena rock scarcely had time for its potency to become 
suspect before punk rock began to spit on the formal excesses of late 60s/early 70s sonic 
habit and wont. Punk rock had several years of “underground” vim and vigour before it 
too became a largely ersatz genre of paint-by-numbers content. It’s a well known tale: 
Leadbelly becomes Blues Hammer; Charles Mingus becomes Kenny G; Dead Kennedys 
become Avril Lavigne. (Not to give the impression that this phenomenon is the exclusive 
domain of the musical arts; e.g., graffiti art, that erstwhile exemplification of urban 
insubordination instantiates itself as the highest grossing art object in world history;5 
Marcel Duchamp becomes Damien Hirst; Hugo Ball becomes an apolitical self-
aggrandizing fashionista, etc, etc). I will return often to the conspicuous phenomenon of 
musical rebellion’s market appropriation as it is instructive. Indeed, trying to turn up 
some information on jazz, as the parlous and subversive musical form it was understood 
for decades to be, using the search terms “jazz” and “dangerous,” will likely provide you 
with search-engine results for Oakley’s limited edition women’s sunglasses, “Jazz 
DANGEROUS.” Anecdotal evidence of this kind would be absurd and pointless if not for 
its obviousness and notorious ubiquity. There is no need for me to invent a brand of 
sunglasses called “Jazz DANGEROUS” in order to make this point -- it is tacitly 
understood that a quick internet search will provide such an item. The interminable 
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5 Graffiti artist David Choe painted murals on the offices of Facebook and was paid in stock options. When 
Facebook went public, Choe’s options were estimated at $200 million. See “David Choe, Facebook’s 
Millionaire Graffiti Artist.” The Daily Beast, 3 Feb 2012.
corporate takeover of countercultural leitmotifs of rebellion is easily understood as a 
tragic joke; it is the sort of thing that might constitute a quip on The Simpsons. 
 Attendant to (and, in some case, intertwined with) the American variant of the 
New Left, hippy fashions reached their stylistic apex in the “counterculture” of the late 
1960s and early 1970s and remain one of the most obvious touchstones of (ostensible) 
oppositional culture : the colourful campus demonstrations, bead-wearing, long hair and 
beards, the re-purposing of military jackets as the garb of hippie peaceniks or yippie 
revolutionaries set to overwhelm the establishment, etc. But this idea is increasingly 
understood to be patently absurd; “the man” simply joined in the chorus and started 
singing hosanna to rugged individualism, which was a foundational myth of Americana 
in the first place. In retrospect, this insight seems hardly revelatory: wasn’t abstract 
expressionism heralded, in the robustly conservative 1950s, as marking American 
individualism in opposition to the tyrannical Stalinist dictates behind Soviet Realism?6 
Wasn’t manifest destiny invoked in all those old western movies? Wasn’t the stentorian 
screeching of long-haired hippies, constantly played on the radio, a highly popular multi-
million dollar celebration of Dionysian impulses? Sadly, although hippie culture is now 
recognized as naive and, in its almost baroque fashion sensibilities and tumid musical 
stylings, highly pretentious (thus ironically belying its eschewal of “phoniness” and all 
things bogus), its legacy is kept alive in the  persistence of the same operational 
narrative: that mass culture is making hamburger of all its radical individuals (as in that 
memorable scene of the school-children walking the meat-factory plank in Pink Floyd’s 
12
6 After allowing for decades of speculation on the topic, the CIA finally admitted to promoting the Abstract 
Expressionist movement via covert funding to traveling exhibitions and art journals. See Frances Stoner 
Saunders, “Modern art was CIA 'weapon',” The Independent, 22 Oct 1995.
The Wall). This narrative can be found in cultural production as dissimilar as the ubiquity 
of paeans to idiosyncratic selfhood via autobiographical overlay in top 40 pop,7 the 
persistent injunction to “keep it real,”8 and, say, the discography of GG Allin and The 
Murder Junkies, an exemplary case of punk music at its most misanthropic, whose output 
includes the albums Hated in the Nation and Eat my Fuc (sic). In each instance, a 
personal authenticity is delineated as against mass culture. The speaker stakes out 
individuality by recourse to declaration of personal experience; commands to expunge 
the “unreal” (suggesting both that the speaker can discern the real from the unreal and 
that the unreal is something that must be kept at bay); and general anti-sociality and 
ressentiment. Ashlee Simpson’s “I Am Me” is then commensurate in its generalized 
defiance to “Eat my Fuc.” Both proclaim from a space opened up by way of contrariety 
or differentiation between the speaker and the broader culture.  
 By the late 1960s, the fat cat mandarins of Madison Avenue -- those selfsame 
avatars of establishmentarianism that hippie culture understood to be decked out in horn-
rimmed glasses, smelling of pomade and shoe polish, head bent in sacerdotal duty to 
bureaucratic domination of the roguish human spirit -- had begun to favour creativity 
over conformity and art over “science” in advertising. A 1966 handbook for copywriters 
at Young & Rubicam advises its readers that “the first rule for copywriters is to be 
suspicious of rules. Rules have a way of turning into ruts” (qtd in Frank, 1998). An 
inflexible sales strategy makes for bad entrepreneurship; capital admits faster and greater 
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7 See, for example, Ashlee Simpson’s I Am Me, Geffen, 2005; Lady Gaga’s Born this Way, Interscope, 
2011; Demi Lovato’s “This is Me,” Camp Rock, Disney, 2008.
8 This directive is endemic to hiphop. Consequently, it has seeped into milieus where it sounds absolutely 
ridiculous. See “Keep It Real” by The Jonas Brothers (from Lines, Vines and Trying Times, Hollywood, 
2009), a manufactured boy-band that constitutes the Disney corporation’s latest update of The Monkees. 
orders of change than even the most pliable youth market segment. Nineteen sixty-six 
was the same year that bigwig advertising writer Nicholas Samstag wrote an article for 
industry favorite, Madison Avenue magazine, titled “You Can’t Make a Good 
Advertisement out of Statistics,” wherein readers were apprised that
Marketing should be an emancipator. It should unlock locks and cut 
bonds by suggesting and implying, by hinting and beckoning, not 
defining. It should be the agent that frees, not the agent that 
imprisons... In brief, we need more and more affirmative, plastic, 
humanistic, refreshing research, less and less scientific 
authoritarianism...  Forward researchers! You have nothing to lose but 
your dogma. (qtd in Frank, 1998)
Invoking no less a document than Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto, Samstag 
immolates the fiction of starched-shirt postwar suburban company man, if such a creature 
ever really existed in the guise in which we understand him (what was the soaring tailfin 
-- growing ever longer with each new model -- of 1950s cars if not a mark of a driver’s 
distinction?). But perhaps the most telling industry document was the paper titled, 
"Conform with the Non-Conformists.” Written by J. Walter Thompson executive Bev 
Corbin, it flagrantly encouraged admen to do things “differently” (qtd in Frank, 1998). 
This coming from the selfsame company that would go on to advertise 7-Up as the 




B. Invidious Comparison: I Do Want What I Haven’t Got
 Mass culture was, by the late 1960s, a collective yearning for individualism 
obscured by the unceasingly popular narrative that society is actually comprised of a 
bunch of drones. This despite the fact that individuation is enshrined in economic 
individualism and its corollaries and cognates, such as Romanticism, protestantism, and 
liberalism. Hindsight is, as they say, 20/20, and so recent articles in the popular press that 
bemoan current fashion and pop-culture as derivative of earlier 20th century cultural 
expression,9 transpose the lament of the individual languishing in mass culture to a 
complaint which perceives fashion trends as lending vigor and health to culture itself, 
thereby disclosing the veneration afforded to competitive expressions of individualism. 
Indeed, the cultural pleonasm that attends the idea of individualism which, post-Mill, 
vehemently insists that happiness is consanguine with liberty, freedom, and individual 
sovereignty -- as if happiness cannot be found in other social arrangements -- testifies to 
the powerful ubiquity and valorization of individualism. This ubiquity suggests a forest-
for-the-trees cultural myopia. 
 Tellingly, individualism, although relegated to the den by popular culture, like an 
inebriated uncle at a Christmas party, is simultaneously identified as both highly elusive 
and a necessary component of contentment. Just like dear uncle Jim when he gets into his 
cups, individualism is nowhere and everywhere. Although this ubiquity would seem to 
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9 See “U.S. Dept. Of Retro Warns: 'We May Be Running Out Of Past'” The Onion. 4 November 1997 and 
“From Fashion To Housewares, Are We In A Decades-Long Design Rut?” Anderson, Kurt. Vanity Fair. 
January, 2012. This second article laments cultural nostalgia and, remarkably, seems to suggest that the lack 
of the “new” stems from technological development monopolizing creative production. There is, in this 
understanding, only so much creativity in the world and technological development is taking too great a 
slice of the productivity pie.
For a considered exploration of recycled popular cultural tropes, see Simon Reynolds’ Retromania: Pop 
Culture’s Addiction to Its Own Past. New York: Faber, 2011.
attest to its presence in everyone’s lives, because its presence is phantasmal, it instead 
indicates a lack. It is presented as a substance to fill a void. A great and important void. It 
is the key to human flourishing, if the overzealousness with which it is mobilized in 
contemporary advertising is anything to go by (the nebulous injunction, “be yourself,” a 
cursory internet search reveals, underpins a Nike Women’s ad campaign; various pop 
songs -- by the likes of Audioslave and Graham Nash --; two record labels; a popular 
sticker celebrating the Oscar Wilde quote, which includes the addendum, “everyone else 
is already taken;” a popular clothing store; a customizable shoe; and an advertising 
campaign for Subway sandwiches). Individualism is, on the one hand, that most rare and 
fleeting elixir that only messiahs, billionaires, action-movie heros and rock stars have 
imbibed, while on the other, that which animates our consumer choices, sense of self and 
the good life and undergirds our orientation in the world (rare is the person that would 
violently assert that their comportment and life decisions are all fastidiously derivative). 
 There are, however, socially destructive possibilities lurking behind a primacy 
afforded to individualism. Or rather, in what “individualism” has come to connote.10 
Generally speaking, individualism is most often portrayed and understood to be more 
about personal panache than it is about individual flourishing and the complicated 
integration of one’s individual will with the general will (i.e., rule of law). Individualism, 
when in the guise of status-seeking, as with the social one-up-manship of “keeping up 
with the Joneses,” marks individuality through consumer goods and/or behaviours. This 
can have disastrous results. Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class, written in 
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10 See Chapter 2
1899, discusses this type of behaviour and, presciently, determines that envy-inducing 
distinction of social worth and merit, as established by what Veblen terms “invidious 
comparison,” is one of the drivers of consumer capitalism. Veblen’s analysis is 
noteworthy in its explanatory power of both the vernacular understanding of modern 
individualism -- as comprising élan and verve that one possesses in advance of one’s 
neighbours  -- and in the relational positioning of its framework. For the canons of taste 
that determine preference can as easily refer to fox hunting, a penchant for polo, or a 
conversational comprehension of abstruse contemporary art (or, indeed, the desire to 
create such works or write or lecture on them!). The use of “Leisure Class” in Veblen’s 
title misdirects the reader; the work does not simply explore the predilections of the late 
19th century haut monde. As Joseph Heath notes, “Veblen must not be understood merely 
as a critic of an obsolete ‘aristocratic’ pattern of upper-class consumption, but rather as 
the progenitor of a general theory of the relationship between class, status, private 
property, and social inequality” (Heath, Veblen 3).
 Veblen’s analysis is integral to much of the popular understanding of 
consumerism as a social vice. Indeed, it was Veblen who turned the phrase, “conspicuous 
consumption.”11 Of course, perceiving “conspicuous consumption” as being the reproof it 
is generally shorthand for -- i.e., an indictment of purchasing too much to satiate a 
vainglorious appetite -- is an incorrect gloss on his theory. His is not a moralizing 
critique, despite the frequent viciousness of his darkly sardonic tone. He does not bemoan 
17
11 Although he uses the term conspicuous “leisure” far more frequently than “consumption,” due to the fact 
that the latter is a marquee of the former -- because those who cannot truly partake of leisure merely display 
indicators of leisure in order to telegraph possession thereof -- it was the latter term that was to became 
popular (which was appropriate, given that such phenomena lent credence to Veblen’s analysis). 
the act of consumption, nor the desirability of leisure. Such acts are understood to serve 
the deeply human proclivities which underwrite consumptive and (un)productive 
behaviours in the first place; both have utility for their individual practitioners or 
possessors (67). His caustic scorn has a different target: the collectively self-defeating 
mechanism of status-hierarchy. Central to this claim is Veblen’s mobilization of the word 
“invidious,” which he 
[uses] in a technical sense [so as to describe] a comparison of persons with 
a view to rating and grading them in respect of relative worth or value [...] 
An invidious comparison is a process of valuation of persons in respect of 
worth. (Veblen, Leisure 25)
By engendering “emulative consumption” (passim), Veblen’s invidious comparison lays 
bare  the problem posed by prestige and distinction that is oftentimes obscured beneath 
the obstinate myth of the hypnotized consumer. The fact that distaste for mindless 
consumerism of this type is often articulated as “conspicuous consumption” -- as when 
used, for example, to refer to the actions of a fake-’n’-baked young urban professional 
cruising a convertible down a main drag -- is, as noted above, an ironic inversion of 
Veblen’s analysis. Moreover, the conversational sense of the phrase overshoots what it 
attempts to aim at -- the word conspicuous alerts us to the fact that the consumption in 
question is deliberate and calculated on the part of the consumer. Nonetheless, the 
colloquial deployment of the allegation of “conspicuous consumption” insists that its 
practitioners are subordinate sheep. Bolstering this notion is a species of criticism, which 
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Joseph Heath calls “The Ideology Critique” (Structure, 3-4), that can be traced to Vance 
Packard’s highly influential exposé of the advertising industry, The Hidden Persuaders. 
 Published in the 1950s, Packard’s book, which revealed the sinister use of 
“scientific” techniques in the advertising industry, left a long shadow. Its effect can still 
be felt: 
It is difficult to overstate the influence of Packard’s book. A best-seller, the 
book inspired a still-thriving faith in high-tech advertising trickery [...] 
The Problem with advertising, The Hidden Persuaders taught, was that it 
was overly manipulative, that it opposed and even subverted “man in his 
long struggle to become a rational and self-guiding being,” that it sought 
to transform us into a nation of robot consumers like “Pavlov’s 
conditioned dog” [...]. (Frank 41)
There can be no doubt, of course, that advertising is not, generally-speaking, beneficial to 
the social fabric. In Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion, Randal Marlin succinctly 
summarizes the types of harms belonging to the creation of advertisements:
[When a product is predictably harmful and advertising increases 
consumption of said product, the advertiser must share responsibility for 
harms effected]. Thus, one category of harms, and hence of ethical issues, 
relates to the product itself. A second category relates to the means used to 
sell a product. Such means may involve deliberate deception; exploitation 
of women; the presentation of a false social picture, demeaning to certain 
minorities; or the promotion of a lifestyle not widely sustainable in the 
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light of environmental concerns. The means may also be immediately 
offensive through noise, visual pollution of the landscape or cityscape and 
the like. (177)
This overview of mischief or injury resultant from advertising, while not perfect, is fairly 
exhaustive and, significantly, avoids making the grandiose claims of Packard’s. 
Advertising may be socially destructive, but this does not make it a svengali of such 
formidable talents as would be needed to manipulate such vast swaths of society. As 
Heath notes, it strains credulity to imagine that multitudes of reflexive agents are all 
behaving irrationally:
Positing widespread irrationality and error as an explanation for organized 
or systematic behaviour patterns tends to suggest a failure of interpretation 
on the part of the theorist, not a rationality deficit on the part of the actors. 
[...] ... the attempt to explain consumerism as some sort of massive 
collective delusion is often a self-defeating theoretical strategy, since the 
ascription of irrationality to agents counts as prima facie evidence against 
any such theory that draws support from such an ascription. (Structure 4)
It is remarkable how Packard’s perception of advertising coheres with the late 60s’ 
connotation of ‘The Man.’ It is therefore worth noting again that, while everyone was, in 
aggregate, bamboozled by that infernal fiend, at an individual level it was difficult to find 
The Man’s cat’s-paws. This situation puts to mind the droll story of the ancient kingdom, 
the harvest of which was determined to be poisoned. Those who ate of it became insane. 
"There is but one thing to do," said the King, "we must eat the grain to survive, but there 
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must be those among us who will remember that we are insane." If everyone in the 60s 
counterculture could discern the sinister touch of The Man amongst their colleagues and 
comrades, one wonders if they themselves might have been similarly contaminated. If so, 
it would have been decorous to remember that such a thing had occurred so as to foster 
greater solidarity and unanimity (especially given that belonging to countercultural 
bohemia was already premised on a fellowship of cultural resistance and repudiation of 
“The System”). Surely it’s unfair to presume that all the arrivistes who bought their tie-
dyes from department stores were frauds. The point being, of course, that once properly 
credentialed, no one remembers ever having sullied themselves with something as crass 
as department stores in the first instance. Rebirth as artiste, beat, punk, greaser, cultural 
critic or what-have-you is autogenous and eternal. No one recognizes the behaviour of the 
false selves of previous lives. Prior to the remarkable transcendence of Ideology is 
embarrassing naivety and bad year-book photos.
 In “The Death of the Hipster,” an article in What was the Hipster? A Sociological 
Investigation, published by the decidedly hip, literary magazine, n+1, Rob Horning 
muses on potential reasons as to why contemporary hipsterism is always denied at the 
individual level (i.e., the term “hipster” is always defined as “not me”):
One must start with the premise that the hipster is defined by a lack of 
authenticity, by a sense of lateness to the scene, or by the fact that his 
arrival fashions the scene -- transforms people who are doing their thing 
into a self-conscious scene, something others can scrutinize and exploit. 
The hipster is that person who shows up and seems to ruin things -- then 
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you can can begin to ask why this person exists, whether he is inevitable, 
whether he can be stopped and what it will take. The hipster’s presence 
specifically forms the illusion of inside and outside, and the idea that 
others will pay for the privilege of being shown through the gate. (82)
The parvenus, of which more later, is the figure whom everyone loathes. It is s/he that 
exposes the arbitrary nature of seemingly “genuine” social protocol. Heath, discussing 
the rules governing Veblenian status hierarchy, notes that
newer members of a social class tend to be acting out, quite consciously, a 
script that older members of the class have long ago internalized [...]. The 
arriviste or the nouveau riche are often accused of vulgarity. Yet often the 
problem is not that they are doing anything wrong; it’s that they are doing 
it all too consciously. This leaves more entrenched members of the class 
feeling exposed, because it reveals the artifice underlying what they prefer 
to regard as a purely natural form of behaviour. (What Bourdieu calls “the 
ideology of natural taste” has correlates within all of these hierarchies 
from “the ideology of good breeding” to “the ideology of natural cool.”). 
(Heath, Veblen 19)
The arriviste, as with those who have come before her, is doing nothing intrinsically inapt 
or unreasonable. If we are charitable for a moment, we can concede that we might behave 
(or have already behaved) precisely as she does. The problem is that the late arrival 
signals that the ever-recurring cycle of competition is set to begin anew. As Veblen writes, 
“[A]s fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and becomes accustomed to the resulting 
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new standard of wealth, the new standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater 
satisfaction than the earlier standard did” (Leisure, 23). Furthermore, this cycle of 
expenditure of time and energy only begets fresh expenditure -- it must, by its very 
nature, demand constant outlay. It cannot attain equilibrium:
...The desire for wealth can scarcely be satiated in any individual instance, 
and evidently a satiation of the average or general desire for wealth is out 
of the question. However widely, or equally, or “fairly”, it may be 
distributed, no general increase of the community’s wealth can make any 
approach to satiating this need, the ground of which is the desire of every 
one to excel every one else in the accumulation of goods. If, as is 
sometimes assumed, the incentive to accumulation were the want of 
subsistence or of physical comfort, then the aggregate economic wants of 
a community might conceivably be satisfied at some point in the advance 
of industrial efficiency; but since the struggle is substantially a race for 
reputability on the basis of an invidious comparison, no approach to a 
definitive attainment is possible. (Leisure, 25 - 26)
This is the collectively self-defeating scenario that Veblen decries as “wasteful.” It must 
be noted, however, that, again, he does not indict the individual’s actions as wasteful. 
Rather, it is the activities and signals of the leisure class -- activities and signals that are 
emulated within and across classes -- resultant from invidious comparison, that is 
wasteful. How, one might reasonably wonder, did we arrive at such a collectively 
injurious situation? Here, to make better sense of his theory, we must consider Veblen’s 
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model of the two instincts -- the proclivities of “workmanship” and predation -- that drive 
human nature. However, before doing so, it is important to recognize a presence that can 
no longer be overlooked. Discussion of the waste of the leisure class telegraphs a distinct 
confabulation; it signals a discussion in the jurisdiction of  “consumerism.” Marx’s model 
of commodity fetishism will be addressed in the next chapter, but as his inhabitance of 
any discourse on consumerism12 is indisputable, a brief discussion of Veblen and Marx 
seems prudent.
 The relationship between Marx and Veblen’s theories are held by many to be a 
vexed one. As Edgell and Townshend note, there exists a body of literature, emerging 
almost as early as Veblen’s own writings, that consists of commentators attesting to both 
the compatibility and incongruity of the two economist’s works (1993). I do not have the 
space to trace the contours of such a debate. Instead, I would like to quickly point to the 
useful consideration provided by Kirsten Ford and William McColloch that enables a 
fruitful positioning of messrs Marx and Veblen, whereby collusion and agreement replace 
potential rancour and dissension. Namely, that a correlation can be drawn between the 
two if attention is paid to their points of departure. The congruity there revealed will 
underscore Marx and Veblen’s shared perception of the “nature of economic life” and 
demonstrate that “many of their conclusions regarding the operation of modern 
capitalism may ultimately be reconciled” (Ford & McColloch 1-2). 
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12 This is not to say that Marxist critique coheres well with “anti-consumerist” critique. Much of what 
constitutes anticonsumerist literature, especially on the far left in such currents as anarcho-primitivism, is 
hostile to progress in production, particularly when it desires a return to agricultural parochialism (see, for 
example, the work of John Zerzan or Derrick Jensen). But these are precisely the conditions that the 
capitalist mode of production liberates us from. Marx calls this type of critique “reactionary 
socialism” (Marx & Engels 245-46). Nonetheless, commodity fetishism is central to the main currents of 
cultural criticism in the 20th century -- the Frankfurt school and Debord being the most obvious examples 
-- and so Marx has undeniably been imputed into disputations in the anti-consumerist canon.
 Marx and Veblen’s rapprochement begins with a rejection of the standard 
misapprehension of Marx’s dialectical materialism as teleological, a blunder perpetrated 
by Veblen in one of his scarce disparagements of Marx, wherein he condemns Marxist 
analysis as, in contrast with his own analysis, “pre-Darwinian,” and expectant of a 
“definitive equilibrium” (Veblen, Followers 596). The perception of Marxist critique as 
simple economic determinism13 (often referred to, amongst Marxists themselves as 
“vulgar Marxism” (Eagleton, Marxism, viii)), is one that can largely be traced to 
Engels’ (somewhat reductive) popularization of Marx in Anti- Dühring. But Marx did not 
see human activity as purely passive. The revolutionary subject, rather, was history’s 
midwife. As Ford and McColloch note, “for Marx, humankind’s objective freedom is 
constituted by the very lack of a singular teleological project in history. Human history is 
teleological only in the sense that it is a progressive realization of human essence; an 
essence which Marx (concurrent with Veblen) does not define a priori as either “good” or 
“bad” (8). 
 Both Veblen and Marx are sensitive to the veiled relations of production: the 
social conflict and alienation belonging to capitalist modernity. Whatever differences 
between the two instanced in allegations as to Marxist teleology are immaterial in the 
face of the similarities shared. Ford and McColloch draw attention to both economist’s 
“mediated starting points” to underscore the contention that both Marxist and Veblenian 
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13 Teleology in Marx is a controversial topic, the extent of which far exceeds anything more than a cursory 
mention here. While it is true that Marxist analysis anticipates the world-historical proletarian 
transcendence of capitalist productive and property relations (i.e., a determinant historical vision), it is not 
true that this is a claim to a final end of history. And indeed, our historical moment, conspicuously devoid 
of any prevalent socialism, demands that some attention be paid to the problems in Marx resulting from the 
need to sidestep “writing recipes for kitchens of the future.” This matter is painstakingly taken up in G. A. 
Cohen’s If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001.
analysis springs from an underlying essentialism14 (this, of course, being the feature in 
Marx problematized by many post-Althusserian readings) that allows for an appreciation 
of the distorted nature of economic life under capitalist modernity. This is necessary to 
avoid the trap of classical political economy (and neo-classical economics), which, 
unable to distinguish between essence and historical existence, mystifies and excuses 
existing social conditions: “In failing to perceive anything beyond the existence of 
historically specific institutions like private property, lines of inquiry remain wedged 
where they should begin, amounting to an apologia for existent class relations” (Ford and 
McColloch 11). 
 Where Marx’s famous analysis of capitalism proceeds from an examination of its 
most basic unit, the commodity (see chapter 2), Veblen’s analysis proceeds from the 
vantage point of business and leisure. As Robert Heilbroner notes of Veblen, “[his inquiry  
began with] the whole set of customs and mores which resulted in that particular kind of 
play called ‘the business system.’ [...] [He] delved into the nature of economic man and 
his economic rites and rituals [...] [and scrutinized the] economic psychopathology of our 
daily lives [...] [In The Theory of the Leisure Class his interest lay] in such questions as 
What is the nature of economic man? How does it happen that he so builds his 
community that it will have a leisure class? What is the economic meaning of leisure 
itself?” ( 221, 230). It is by virtue of Marx and Veblen’s respective starting points within 
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14 Ford and McColloch  appear to be mobilizing “essentialism” in a humanist sense, whereby essence 
points to humankind’s “nature.” Of course, even the young Marx did not refer to human essence as an 
eternal, abstract object.  Rather, the “essence” or “species being” that Marx and Veblen are here applauded 
for employing is more an ever-changing plurality and/or potentiality that unfolds historically. This 
“essence” is exactly that which we are alienated from so long as material conditions distort our reality. See 
Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” in The German Ideology, pp 120 -123, and Eric Fromm’s Marx’s Concept of 
Man, pp 24 - 42, 69 - 79.
their respective historical moments -- “The ‘Business Man,’ as a principal expression of 
modern existence, plants Veblen’s inquiry solidly in the historically specific features of 
the present economic system, as does the commonplace commodity for 
Marx” (McColloch and Ford 13) -- that both are able to reveal truths about the 
functioning of capitalism and its “failures to produce conditions favorable to essential 
human life” (ibid.).  The mediated starting points of both enable a penetrating view of the 
functioning of capitalism without the “obfuscation that comes from universalizing the 
particular” (ibid.). From these vantage points and as “essentialists,” both are able to 
discern the problems inhering in social relations: “[the priority paid to] the 
interrelatedness of modern production (itself made visible by way of chosen 
presupposition through which to navigate the specific nature of economic life) brings out 
from under the coverings of its universalization the “hidden” nature of ownership. 
Accordingly, both conclude that on the condition that the present system of ownership 
persists, human beings are blocked from living in a system more fully in accord with their 
essential nature” (Ford & McColloch 17). The take away point here, insofar as it relates 
to the broader issues at play in this paper, is that the view that Veblen can complement 
Marx and vice versa is not inappropriate or fallacious. For our purposes, the significance 
of this is most pertinent in the fruitful tension between the two in explicating social 
controls and the continuity of an exploitative status quo. Veblen’s theory of status 
competition places the notion of emulation where Marxist scholarship has often placed 
theories of hegemony.  
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 I would like to now quickly return to Veblen’s use of the terms “instinct of 
workmanship” and “predatory instinct” so as to give a clearer picture of how invidious 
comparison foments status hierarchy. Veblen believes that social behaviour is determined 
by these two fundamental instincts. The instinct of workmanship is the consequence of 
humankind’s ceaseless activity. This activity is “unfolding and impulsive,” but also 
instrumental or “teleological” (Veblen, Leisure 12). That is, human action is always 
aimed toward some end; it has an objective. Over time, this tendency results in an 
appreciation of the most efficient means of realizing ends: “[a human agent] is possessed 
of a taste for effective work, and a distaste for futile effort. He has a sense of the merit of 
serviceability or efficiency and of the demerit of futility, waste, or incapacity (Veblen, 
Leisure 13). Veblen, in his references to the differences between tribes and communities 
of “primitive savages,” allows that this valuation of instrumentality is culturally 
contingent, and a case could perhaps be made that the notion of the “instinct of 
workmanship,”15 holding, as it does, skill and efficiency in high esteem, is itself an 
appraisal borne of a cultural regard for pragmatic rationality. Nonetheless, Veblen’s point 
stands: those acts that assist in the collective goal of survival are, over time, venerated. 
They require skill and these skills come to be admired. Concomitant to admiration for 
skillful work is disdain for wastefulness and uselessness.
 Conversely, the “predatory instinct,” a proclivity or behaviour manifest in social 
life, is an expression of exploitation or prowess, rather than industry or diligence (Veblen, 
Leisure 10). A predatory culture emerges from one of non-invidious workmanship and 
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15 Jim McGuigan contends that Veblen’s work contains a tension in capitalist culture between the old, 
protestant work ethic and an “emerging hedonism pioneered by the rich and emulated increasingly 
throughout the twentieth century by the lower orders” (Cool 88). 
sets the stage for class-based culture (Veblen, Leisure 147 - 148). A hunter-gatherer 
society may well have differentials in abilities and capacities for workmanship -- some 
individuals will likely have greater aptitudes for given tasks, say, hunting, fishing, 
carving, etc -- and may be treated accordingly with honorifics and the like. Once the 
struggle against environmental dangers is instead turned inward to human-on-human 
relations, a culture transforms into one where predation is the rule of the day and status 
hierarchy becomes a hierarchy of dominance (Veblen, Leisure 147). The result, of course, 
is division of labour along gender lines and the concept of property extending beyond 
simple personal belongings, exhibited in patriarchal domination and “ownership” of 
women (Veblen, Leisure 38, 48 - 49).
 Once a culture has sufficient economic surplus to ensure the persistence of 
predatory social relations, an unambiguous class structure emerges. Because the upper 
classes, by virtue of their owning the means of production, simply appropriate the wealth 
they need, they are able to abstain from work and so become the “leisure” class. Indeed, 
they are not only exempt from labour, they are prohibited from “industrial” toil (Veblen, 
Leisure 4). But “leisure” is a misnomer. And here is where the perspicacity of Veblen’s 
analysis come to light. Counter to the sloth and luxuriating one would expect a life of 
affluence and prosperity to elicit, the rich are often incredibly busy people. This is 
because the instinct of workmanship is never properly vanquished, but rather is 
transposed so as to underlie invidious distinction. A peculiar inversion of values is here 
effected and uselessness becomes celebrated because it signifies leisure (Veblen Leisure, 
94, 96, 125). The predatory class, set apart from the labouring classes, has fewer and 
29
fewer opportunities to display its prowess. The result is the invented labour-intensive 
activities and the accumulation of honorific objects, accoutrements, artifacts of the upper 
classes. Bizarrely, the activities of the rich, though requiring great exertion and skill, 
must, in order to demarcate between the activities of the lower classes, be unambiguously 
useless. Conspicuous waste is thus like a vestigial tail: it is the lingering workmanship 
instinct of the predatory class. Veblen is quick to point out that such activities are not a 
result of laziness and often characterizes conspicuous leisure as performance (45, 56, 99, 
et passim), a characterization that has caustic resonances with many behaviours in 
contemporary demographics of the cultural vanguard and with species of criticism which 
attempt to rehabilitate the salacious and reconstruct hedonic transgression as political 
and/or significant cultural resistance.
 Where Veblen discusses many of the behaviours contemporaneous to his analysis 
as examples of conspicuous leisure -- manners, classical languages, aesthetic 
discernment, etc (Leisure 34) -- it is not difficult to see the direct progeny of these 
behaviours in contemporary phenomena like fixed-gear bikes; facility with canons of 
obscure art and music; gauges, plugs and flesh tunnels; anti-consumerist sentiment; 
localvore diets,16 etc. This points to an aspect of conspicuous leisure that has changed 
dramatically since Veblen’s time, no doubt due to the consumer revolution in the first part 
of the twentieth century and the relative plenitude of the post war global north. In place 
of aristocratic leisure, we have bourgeois conspicuous consumption, which today 
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16 HBO’s Bored to Death waggishly illustrates the prevalence of the localvore trend. Demonstrating that it 
is hardly the exclusive domain of bohemian dumpster-divers, "We Could Sing a Duet,” from season 3, 
depicts the conflict between two New York restauranteurs whose rivalry reaches a fever-pitch when the 
second claims to source his food from 50-miles outside the city, undercutting by half the first 
restauranteur’s claim of sourcing from a measly 100 miles out from Manhattan’s urban center.
oftentimes takes the form of nonconformity and hip alterity. Veblen is correct that 
emulative consumption is a cross class phenomenon, but where his model appears to 
move from top to bottom,a peculiar side-effect of the search for “noncomformity” is a 
tendency to purloin from the working classes. Alterity is as much heterodox cool as it is 
blue collar orthodoxy (think liberty spikes in working class jeans, lanky musicians 
sporting lumberjack beards, sunglasses and trucker ballcaps, etc.). Conspicuous 
emulation seems, in this light, to percolate upwards. It is surely true that working class 
totems telegraph an unvarnished simplicity and sincerity and it is telling that these 
characteristics should receive such high regard. What this seems to suggest is a desire for 
the evasive specter of the highly sought-after, storied and nebulous authentic. 
C. Framed by the Liberal Public Sphere: Transgression and Authenticity
 The foregoing has stressed as a certainty that overzealous commitment to 
singularity, in aggregate, quickly becomes a race to the bottom scenario. But what might 
this scenario actually look like? As with the joke about the island of people whose esteem 
in the community is predicated on how immoderate their behaviour and adornment, it 
does not take long for things to get out of control. The population of this joke’s island 
environment consist of a rather doleful group and their sensibilities in dress run toward 
dark colours, piercing, and body modification. Saturnine celebrations held with a regular 
frequency allow island denizens to preen and strut in front of their fellow islanders. Their 
frippery, naturally, becomes ever more extreme, as each attempts to out do one another’s 
celebration of lugubriousness. It is not long before aureate tattooing, scarification and 
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branding gave way to cutting off the skin of one’s face in rectangle shapes, the base of 
which is left intact. This allows for the strip of the skin that has covered the rectangle to 
be rolled back, much like the tin on a sardine can, and fastened to the remaining 
epidermis. This revealing of the dermis and, where the cutting runs deep enough, bits of 
subcutis flesh, enables the exposure of greater views of the musculature on one’s face. 
Moreover, it surely gives solemn testimony to the resolve of its practitioners; one does 
not easily second-guess the funereal sincerity of a compatriot willing to cut off parts of 
her or his own face in the name of Young Wertherianism, the sublime beauty of 
impermanence, the dark mysteries of the lunar cycle, or what have you.
  As you’ve likely guessed, there is no such joke, but maybe there should be, even 
if it’s not even half-way amusing as gallows humour. I’ve just re-told the story of certain 
strains of goth and/or BDSM manner and custom in a reductive, but arguably apt, 
fashion. To see pictures of people peeling their own skin off for social functions, a 
behaviour which does, in fact, exist in the manner I have described, I suggest you find a 
copy of 90s and early aughts magazine, Torture Garden. This bad faux joke does two 
things. It illustrates the problematic effects of competition in idiosyncrasy; that is, how 
easily status seeking can lead to a collective action problem -- the further a gesture of 
authenticity is, quite reasonably,17 pushed by an individual, the further the goal posts of 
what gestures will past mustard are extended for the group. Furthermore, this face-cutting 
thought experiment opens the door to considerations of what is and is not considered 
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17 Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter have written extensively on how Veblenian invidious comparison is a 
socially destructive zero-sum game. As I have mentioned, Veblen himself stresses that invidious 
competition is a rational behaviour from the standpoint of the individual. Heath and Potter underline this 
further with the term “defensive consumption:” the need to keep up with the Joneses is not simply the 
reserve of intentional status seeking and the predatory classes, it is the plight of anyone who does not want 
to undergo the humiliation of falling behind the current or zeitgeist of their demographic profile (115).
beyond the pale in the liberal public sphere. It points to a discussion of what belongs to 
public and private selves and spaces. These are items I will return to frequently, often 
framed using coordinates coined by John Durham Peters in Courting the Abyss: Free 
Speech and the Liberal Tradition. Durham Peters‘ notion of “abyss-artists” and “abyss-
redeemers” informs many of my forthcoming musings on authenticity. To see the manner 
in which he deploys such terms, it is necessary to step back and take another look at what 
is represented by face-cutters I have just evoked.
 Communities which flagrantly defy convention exist, of course, in non-
caricatured, deadly serious fashion. Whether Pentecostal snake-handlers, Norwegian 
Black Metal enthusiasts, modern primitives or the aforementioned goth communities, 
enclaves which stake out identity via markers of difference are legion. But whether or not 
their mobilization of difference is a result of religious or secular inclination and 
conviction, it is difficult to not see how Veblenian sociality is operative. I am less 
concerned, of course, with those instances of difference that rest upon religious ritual -- 
where asociality is more an accidental byproduct of a gesture of faith -- than with 
knowing or intentional instances of oppositional activities. As Judith Butler has famously 
written of the performativity of drag-queens, opposition to constructions of power must 
source its power on the selfsame constructions it wishes to subvert (123).  Because one 
cannot step outside of social relations, the act of resistance must re-inscribe the cultural 
norms it seeks to resist; the resultant space of ambivalence, of inversion, of irony, is one 
of agency. This argument is compelling and it is easy to see it instanced in “lifestyle” 
politics. However, the problem posed by invidious comparison surely persists. And if the 
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mechanism whereby difference is instantiated is itself a result of Veblenian predation and 
culminates, ultimately, as a zero-sum game within the communities where it is 
operative,18 both its efficacy and headsprings or origination demand examination. 
 Surely Butler’s insight is correct: the selfsame social norms which are resisted in 
oppositional performativity (or the creation of a subversive or incendiary social act or 
object) form the outer bounds from which resistance can be marshaled. Outside of the 
context of dominant governmentalization (or whatever term one prefers to point to the 
phenomenon of subject formation), even oppositional behaviour becomes incoherent. But 
what does it mean when resistance or subversion itself instances a continuation of 
oppression and socially pernicious behaviour? And what can be said of the act of 
explaining, justifying, translating the value of the result of such behaviour (as in the role 
of the critic)? Does the critic’s act of explication and exposition itself instance a case of 
invidious comparison (via the cultural capital that criticism confers on its exponent)? And 
what are the constellations from which this arrangement emerges? What is the ballast that 
is desirable in this coordinate system? If the benefits of oppositional performativity are 
obvious in the case of Butler’s example of drag culture, perhaps it is better to examine 
instances where the manner of subverting cultural domination is so extreme that it is 
conceivably worse than the re-inscription of the coordinates of oppression, subordination 
and emancipation that always-already attend acts of resistance. 
 The works of the Viennese Actionists, that cohort of European performance artists 
making works throughout the 1960s and into the 70s, consisted of staged events -- 
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18 To say nothing of the fodder it provides for the reproduction of invidious comparison amongst multiple 
strata of class hierarchy.
“actions” -- which relished the profane. Violence, destruction, nudity, fluids were their 
hallmark; from vomit to shit, flagellation to sodomy, if it was something coded as 
“debased” by dominant culture, chances are the Viennese Actionists made it happen for a 
viewing public.19 Two things immediately impress themselves on the mind of someone 
considering such antics: 1) The question of production: What are the cultural coordinates 
in which such works emerge; what gives rise to the manner of their production? And 2) 
The manner of reception: Is the viewer offended? Disgusted? Saddened? What is the 
appropriate response? How is it that the viewer is oftentimes convinced of such works’ 
value?  
 Writing of an episode of “erotic vomiting” -- a performance art piece recounted 
by Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner (2002) -- Durham Peters notes
If the audience is shocked [...], that reaction only serves to as evidence of 
how deep its complicities go [...] and the degree to which apparently 
spontaneous feelings of pity or disgust are already facts of power. Warner 
can bank on on an academic audience thinking it is bad form to look 
uptight in public; “prude” is nearly as bad a thing in culturally liberal 
spheres as “Nazi” or “racist,” since it implies not only a moral deficiency 
but weakness in taste. The first person caught holding his or her nose 
loses. If you feel grossed out, then perhaps you ought to reflect on whether 
your compunctions are complicit with oppression. Guilt makes liberals 
enablers. Abyss-artists practice a leading kind of moral suspension: 
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19 A good round up of their videos, for the (morbidly) curious can be found at Ubuweb: 
www.ubu.com/film/vienna_actionists.html
refusing to pass judgment and operating, perhaps, like Warner’s 
performer’s, just “at the threshold of gagging.” (90)
Durham Peters’ “Abyss-artist” is that character who does not shrink from the void and, 
indeed, is happy to plumb its depths for the secrets contained therein. As Peters’ puts it, 
“to know madness and folly is the business of abyss-artistry, whose modern form enjoys 
the added aura of Promethean rebellion or Faustian striving. The “black writers of the 
bourgeoisie,” as [Horkheimer and Adorno] called Machiavelli, Sade, Nietzsche, and the 
like, were all engaged in teaching an amor intellectualis diaboli as the counterpart to (and 
hidden truth of) Enlightenment reason” (85 - 86). The abyss-artist is s/he who unveils the 
repressed secrets of life that are shunted to the closet or are held in check by the 
superego; theirs is a world where ethics are suspended in the name of higher truths, 
catharsis and the productive forces of transgression.20 But the abyss-artist is in need of 
collaborators. Given that even the most graphic, uncensored -- explicit -- art is implicit in 
its communication with the world (i.e, its viewer), it requires translation (particularly 
translation of its worth or value, i.e., explication coincident with pointers as to how it 
might be read). Art and action, and especially art that consists of action, as with our 
Viennese Actionists, is vague. Its signification is palpably open-ended. As Peters’ notes, if 
Jonathan Swift had decided that A Modest Proposal might have been improved by 
fidelity to its actual content and so dubbed it An Ironic Proposal, its success would have 
been spoiled (91). Irony is perhaps the most illustrative mode of the abyss-artist: oblique 
articulations of the wink-wink, nudge-nudge variety. “Can you believe I’m doing this?” 
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20 Abyss-artistry is thus a cognate for my working interpretation of alterity and alternative media.
the performer seems to ask her viewer. Unequivocal communication neuters irony, 
ambiguity and imprecision, the victuals of abyss-artistry. This is why abyss-artists need 
their redeemers; they require this symbiotic relationship in order that their works be 
disseminated and understood as worthy of the public sphere. The abyss-redeemer 
fashions the “warning label, the clarifying caption, the moral commentary that tries to 
salvage and justify the excursion into the abyss” (Durham Peters 87).  
 This arrangement constitutes the means by which much art is decoded, 
interpreted: “The relations between [...] artists and redeemers involves a curious division 
of communicative labor. [...] The irrational speaker aids the mental and moral exercise of 
the rational listener. The speaker’s outrageousness is supposed to stimulate the listener’s 
reasonableness. If the moderation of the listener were to infect the speaker or the 
certainty of the speaker were to infect the listener, the check-and-balance system would 
be upset” (Durham Peters 91). Irony, suggestion, deviousness, circumlocutions -- the 
palette of the implicit -- is located in the communication system itself, not in the 
communicating agent; left to their own devices, abyss-artists would exist in a cyclone of 
chaos and abyss-redeemers would become anemic (Durham Peters 92). To put it another 
way, the Body Art of Orlan21 or the Chapman Brothers’ mannequins of naked children 
with penises for noses22 could not exist outside of their historical moment. This 
seemingly pedestrian observation is not in reference to the matter of content, which of 
course cannot help but belong to the evolving canons of art historical aesthetics, or even 
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21 Orlan puts herself under the knife of plastic surgeons to interrogate registers of female beauty. Her re-
modeled face will be a composite of Venus, Diana, Europa, Psyche and Mona Lisa. See <www.orlan.net>
22 See the Chapman Brothers’ piece, “Zygotic Acceleration, Biogenetic, De-Sublimated Libidinal Model” 
at <litmed.med.nyu.edu/Annotation?action=view&annid=12886>
form, which answers to the same demands. But running in tandem with aesthetic canons 
and prescripts are the mechanisms by which a work or gesture becomes comprehensible. 
The communicative mode of such works would likely register them as incoherent -- 
rather than outre or provocative -- outside of the modern coordinates to which they 
belong. What then are the features of this structure of communication that foster the 
arrangement of abyss-artist and -redeemer?
 The liberal public sphere cherishes absolute freedom of expression. This is the 
badge it brandishes when its credentials as deputy of liberty are questioned. Perhaps it is 
an exclusionary space. Perhaps its abstracted character reduces its representations of 
active denizens to masculine and well-heeled persons of means; exactly those citizens 
whose social privilege fortifies them for the civic self-transcendence demanded by the 
bright glare of the open agora. But this is, we are told, the price that is to be paid for the 
rational and even-handed indifference of the public sphere. However, what if the 
expression contained within the public sphere is itself also a result of this selfsame faux 
inclusivity? In “‘The Marketplace of Ideas:’ A History of a Concept,” John Durham 
Peters makes a good case for the fait accompli between “marketplace of ideas” and the 
public sphere. The former maps perfectly onto the seeming permissiveness of the public 
sphere, thus demonstrating that the ostensible meritocracy of objects and messages 
deployed within the circuits of liberal publicity is suspect (or simply predicated on the 
same old dreary and pernicious inequities fomented by liberal capitalism). The liberal 
tradition likens free speech with free enterprise, thereby bolstering the notion that any 
declaration or utterance can be appraised on its own merits and its price determined by 
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open and unfettered competition. But even free market advocates would be advised to 
take stock of this association. Peters observes of this correlation that “[it] sells short older 
visions of the human estate, for instance, the Aristotelian notion, refracted via Hegel, 
Marx and Dewey, that economic activity is basic to our species not as barter (exchange) 
but as the creativity of labor (production), or the Platonic-Christian belief that 
renunciation of both private acquisition and public agonism can be honorable” (Peters, 
Marketplace 80).
 Seen in this light, abyss-redeemers may be acting as functionaries of commercial 
logics, lending value to abyss-artistry by way of explanations as to the worthiness of 
transgressive tonics and draughts. As when one claims of Viennese Actionism that its 
violence and moral turpitude does not exceed the horrors and unfreedoms of the world, 
perpetuated by the “externalized” inequity resultant from systemic accumulation by 
dispossession, inherent to the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, one might be 
tempted to say that the performances of the Viennese Actionists, with their flagrant and 
scabrous sexual and physical excesses, forcefully reiterate and reflect our complicity in 
violence, interwoven, literally, in the fabric of our clothing. We might be tempted to 
compose any number of hackneyed justifications and rationales, but where we might be 
tempted to say that, further, Viennese Actionism is too extreme, too vicious to be 
commodified and that this also plays to its covert genius, we would be mistaken. Too 
many abyss-redeemers have argued on its behalf in advance of these small considerations 
and Viennese Actionism is safely ensconced in the upper echelons of the art world, 
enjoying display at the likes of the TATE modern, the Museum Moderner Kunst 
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(MUMOK) and Vienna’s Museum of Applied Arts (MAK).23 The question then becomes, 
what is it about abyss-artistry that conscripts the ministrations of the abyss-redeemer? If 
we allow that there is an in-built tendency in liberal theory to equate toleration 
(celebration?) of trespass and heterodoxy with freedom, the actions of the abyss-redeemer 
is made transparent. But why these types of objects and performances? Why these modes 
of expression? It is surely not simply the act of transgression itself that ensures the 
attention of the abyss-redeemer. Why would a chat-room of unabashed libertines, 
relishing discussion of coprophilia or pedophilia or what have you, likely have no other 
defenders than the ACLU?  Such an occurrence would not constitute abyss-artistry. And 
yet a short film or story depicting the discussions and travails of such individuals would 
likely attract a bevy of brave defenders (perhaps with wine glasses in hand and evening 
dress in full display).24 Put another way, why would a clandestine meeting of the Red 
Army Faction count as little more than sedition and terrorist conspiracy, and yet a 
transcription of such a meeting could ostensibly be the talk of the town, if projected on a 
white wall, with attendant lighting, music, and helpful cues as to strategies of 
interpretation courtesy of the abyss-redemption disgorged by the speechifying and erudite 
discussion made by gallery patrons’ very loud and important voices. 
 The liberal tradition has amongst its numerous antecedent conventions the 
distinction of private and public. This divide asserts itself in the rise of the political 
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23 See “Clean Up Your Act” Frieze Magazine, June-August 2004 and <www.tate.org.uk>
24 This is a loaded question that, pursued doggedly, would evoke the age-old inquiry as to the human 
penchant for representation and art-making generally. This is obviously far beyond the reach of my paper. 
Further, the idea of transgressive art as aiding and abetting social decoding or deterritorialization in its 
disruption of established codes of meaning or its functioning as homology for the instability and havoc of 
capitalism is, in some senses, merely diagrammatic. And I am here interested in trying to unearth an 
underlying “why” as to the particular allure of the phrasing or form of abyss-artistry.
individual. The modern conception of citizenry, as opposed to feudal self-definition 
belonging entirely to fixed, inherited social roles, sets the stage for constitutionalism and 
economic individualism. As Andrew Potter notes, “[the distinction] between positive law 
and custom, are creatures of that quintessential institution of modernity, the sovereign 
state. And once they are in place, they are able to evolve into their fully developed form, 
the liberal distinction between the public realm, which is within the law’s reach, and the 
private realm, which is a sphere of personal conscience, worship and pursuit” (34). But 
the idea that one must suspend personal predilection in the interest of the greater good, 
i.e., public communication, rests on the older, stoic notion of emotional detachment 
fostering the public good (Rist 263). This is because the public, i.e., community, is a 
place of instruction and teaching. Teaching succeeds best in arenas of disinterestedness 
and discipline (beneath a shadow of macho masochism, that trait of the public sphere 
which welcomes transgressive articulations in the interest of making the body politic 
more hale; “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger” is the most basic claim of the free 
speech ideal). Laying the track for the liberal penchant for self-abstraction or 
transcendence in the name of public toleration, stoic conception of the public as open, 
indifferent and detached marks it in contrast with the personal as a site of interest, regard, 
arousal, passion. If the public sphere is aloof and phlegmatic, the private sphere is 
engaged and choleric. 
 This division reappears, in somewhat modified form, in the bugbear presented by 
self-consciousness, which can be traced to the Sermon on the Mount (Durham Peters 42). 
In Matthew 6:3, Jesus praises those deeds which are done free from self-regard (“let not 
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your right hand know what your left hand is doing”). Munificent deeds are sullied by an 
audience, even if it only is oneself who is doing the watching. In the Christian tradition, 
from which come conventions that colour western culture, whether secular or no, 
goodness cannot be in the awareness of its possessor, lest it become premeditated or a 
matter of theater and masquerade. The eye of the other or the self spoils “uninhibited 
authenticity” (Durham Peters 42): 
For Christianity publicity corrupts [...]. Do good in the closet, says the 
Sermon on the Mount; let no one see but god. How are you supposed to 
act once you are conscious that it is better to act without self-
consciousness? [...] Nothing shows the inner kinship of Christianity and 
Romanticism more clearly than the strange psychic oscillation between the 
joys of unconsciousness and in the inhibitions of self-reflection they share. 
(Durham Peters 43).
This further distinction between the purity of intention belonging to the unwitnessed act 
and the pitfalls attendant to public space and the problems arising from being surveilled 
further emphasize the character of what is nurtured and sustained by the private self as 
fervour, feeling, soul. Romanticism, which could pass as an entire school dedicated to 
abyss-artistry, held fast to this knowledge: “drugs, madness, infatuation, faith, and art 
above all are paths Romantics have trod in quest of divine self-forgetfulness” (Durham 
Peters 44) and, arguably, set the stage and established the template for modern 
oppositional production. Talk of extemporaneity and the “creative process” are awash 
with adjectives of approbation, such as “inspiration,” “originality,” and “ingenuity.” This 
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is not to say that they are not fitting or appropriate descriptions of creative productions, 
only that they signal the revelation at the heart of the esteemed part of the creative 
enterprise (not the dreary hours of practice and premeditated planning, nor the anxiety of 
influence; only the divine moment of execution is ever given regard). This is what is 
being communicated when artists interviewed in magazines and television discuss their 
work as being the result of auto-genesis: “I don’t know, man, it just comes to me” -- they 
are telegraphing the evasion of observance of their most secret (and creatively fecund) 
self.
 It is possible, in my view, that it is these ineffable attributes -- of passion and 
spirit -- that are smuggled into the public sphere by way of abyss-artistry.25And it is like 
ambrosia to the abyss-redeemer. The dividing line between the tough-minded, detached 
professionalism of publicness and the sincerity or genuineness of the unobserved private 
self is best expressed in contemporary parlance as the authentic. And it is all the more 
pronounced if we associate the public sphere with its popular analogue of the market:
[To be self-conscious] about authenticity is self-defeating. Authenticity is 
like authority or charisma: if you have to tell people you have it, then you 
probably don’t. [Moreover] authenticity has an uneasy relationship with 
the market economy. This is because authenticity is supposed to be that 
which is spontaneous, natural, innocent and “unspun,” and for most 
people, the cash nexus is none of these. Markets are the very definition of 
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25 This characterization coheres somewhat with Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of desiring-production 
-- i.e., the productive force of the unconscious -- in that the unconscious seeping into the public sphere via 
abyss-artistry would account for the high value attached to it (even if representation is thought to be a site 
of repression or distortion) (Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 1-6, 109, 110).
that which is planned, fake, calculating, and marketed. That is, selling 
authenticity is another way of making it self-conscious, which is again, 
self-defeating. (Potter 114)
The abyss-artist, worker of materials excavated from authentic ore belonging to the 
private sphere, can shore up the credentials of the abyss-redeemer. It can supply her/him 
with considerable cultural capital, coincident with every critical insight and sagacious 
remark, with which to turboboost cycles of invidious comparison. The question of why 
one would desire a position in the creative economies, within the context of our historical 
moment (i.e., that of late capitalism) has been considered before, often negatively (see the 
epigram of this chapter). It should go without saying, that the métier of abyss-artist itself, 
raises the stocks of one’s invidious distinction in such a way as to make tolerable the fact 
that the rent cheque keeps bouncing. But the value that has heretofore been referred to in 
this paper as cultural capital ought to be named authenticity. This is the coveted quality 
which undergirds the entire edifice of abyss-artistry and -redemption. And, as we will see 
in chapter 3, this fact has not gone unnoticed by capital and its apparatchiks.
 In a spate of abyss-redemption, bordering on orgasmic, Terry Eagleton discusses 
the protagonist of Thomas Mann’s re-telling of the Faust legend:
Adrian is a Dionysian artist, plumbing the depths of human wretchedness 
in order to pluck order from chaos. His art strives to wrest the spirit from 
the flesh, wholeness from affliction, the angelic from the demonic. If the 
artist seeks to redeem a corrupt world by the transfigurative power of his 
art, then he or she must be on intimate terms with evil. This is why the 
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modern artist is the secular version of Christ, who descends into the hell of 
despair or destruction in order to gather it into eternal life. (Evil 58 - 59)
My point is not that the modern artist may not, in fact, be the secular version of Christ, 
though the possibility that s/he may be an empty headed trust-fund art star, exploiting the 
axiomatic communicative mechanisms of the liberal public sphere with appropriately 
“demonic” gestures is not wholly irrelevant. The problem is that the liberal public sphere 
determines the script. The problem is that even works made by those who desire to 
dissent in good faith are recuperated by the logic of the liberal public sphere, which pays 
value to transgression in order to prop up its own deficiencies and lacunae. Alternative 
media or abyss-artistry does not materialize in a vacuum, but emerges from this particular 
arrangement. Consequently, it recapitulates the very dynamics it wishes to destroy by, 
unwittingly, fomenting a valuation paid to the wrong side -- literally, the business-end -- 
of transgression. 
D. Alternative Media: Myriad Forms
 If invidious comparison is as ubiquitous as Veblen would have us believe, and the 
purview or province of alternative media constitutes some ineffable manifestation or 
expression of this phenomenon -- in its always being “ahead” of mass culture’s “actual” 
desires --, then what is the use of meditating on its physiognomy, character or 
development? Isn’t alternative media simply a more honest expression of mass cultural 
anxieties and aspirations? If so, then, like Popeye, that paragon of transparency, 
alternative media can claim, “I yam what I yam,” or perhaps, like the old testament god, 
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“I am that I am” (Exodus 3:14). Alternative media is named, known (in whatever guise, 
as with Yahweh) and will provide answers if sought after. It must then be understood as 
present and available for those willing to pursue, investigate and make inquiries of it; 
inquiries from which much, presumably, can be revealed. Sadly, this is not the case; 
alternative media is not simply the obverse of disavowed culture. It may, as with the 
larger cultural engine beneath which it labours, be ignited by emulative consumption, but 
Veblen’s schematic does not seem sufficient ground from which to judge, reckon with or 
pigeonhole all forms of alternative media. Especially in light of the fact that some of its 
component parts -- such as its news-oriented faction -- appear far too utilitarian to easily 
accommodate parallels made of it and the predatory instinct. It may often constitute itself 
as the forerunner of a given fashion cycle; the pioneer (or perhaps coal mine canary) 
making the inaugural foray into a cycle of status-hierarchy jockeying. But it is 
multifarious and requires some consideration outside of the cause-and-effect 
characterization suggested by my reading of Veblen within an abyss-artistry-redemption 
framework. I will therefore finish this chapter with a brief overview of alternative 
media’s most prevalent varieties.
 We have established that alternative media does not accommodate easy designation. 
Other than its thorough heterogeneity at the level of content, however, it is often also 
distinguished by its tendency toward non-hierarchical and grassroots organization, 
openness, transparency, participatory nature and political commitments (Uzelman, 2005; 
O’Sullivan et al. 1994). Here we see the traits of alternative media as it is most often 
perceived: as an antidote to “the media.” Much alternative media is in response to the 
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contemporary media climate of globalized corporate media control (Thussu, 2000; 
Herman & McChesney, 1997) and often attempts to draw attention to media 
corporatization and lobbies for structural media reform. This type of alternative media is 
extensive and takes the forms of blogs, magazines, fanzines, community radio, and even 
syndicated radio programs, such as Pacifica’s “Democracy Now!”. It is also found in 
participatory networks such as Independent Media Center (Indymedia), an online 
collaboration between international grassroots collectives that report on political issues. 
 In fact, there are concerns that the digital proliferation of such media is so extensive 
that the possibility of counterhegemonic articulations are lost in the effluvia of ever-
burgeoning communicativity; that is, that the amplification of communicative access has 
contributed to political anemia. This is due the deluge of information and spectacle 
undermining political content -- the particulars of political discourse are lost within vast 
data streams: the monetized circulation, the capitalization of constant movement -- as 
well as the “fantasy of participation,” wherein one believes that one’s contribution to 
rivers of data is a political action and absolves oneself of further political engagement. 
These problems describe phenomena that Jodi Dean calls “Communicative 
Capitalism” (Dean 2008) and comprise a serious dilemma for even the most stubbornly 
starry-eyed advocate of digital political utopias. 
 The fact that the globalizing market economy has aided and abetted the 
convergence of media is generally understood to be an unassailable observation 
(Bagdikian, 1997; Herman & McChesney, 1997). Commodification of news media leads 
to media that is driven by market demands and the deleterious effects of such demands 
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are, by now, relatively well known: the centralizing of media control in the hands of 
business elite; media that has its content shaped by advertiser interest; the subsequent 
propensity for media to take the form of entertainment; minimal public participation, etc 
(Herman & McChesney, 1997, Chomsky & Herman, 1988). Responses to this state of 
affairs comprise the journalistic media initiatives listed above. It is worth noting, 
however, that Herman and Chomsky’s “propaganda model” of news media (in the global 
north) may paint a picture of the mediascape in overly broad strokes. In contrast to the 
dominant ideology thesis of the propaganda model, those overviews of news media that 
admit of a struggle for social leadership, best articulated in Gramscian terms as 
ideological hegemony, between cultural producers and consumers, allow for recognition 
of the (ostensibly) free and open debate characteristic of open democracies and the 
critical scrutiny that news media inevitably receives. Cultural “producers” and 
“consumers” are increasingly porous categories, what with the ascension of the so-called 
“prosumer” and the “content generators” of the network revolution enabling individuals 
to act as bardic functionaries or media watch-dogs, giving more play and creating more 
tension between traditional conceptions of production and reception. Nonetheless, 
focusing exclusively on the fact that critical scrutiny of the media may well be 
blackballed or distorted, that is, managed, by dominant and monopolistic news media 
conglomerates acting at the behest of economic and political interests, is to concentrate 
exclusively on cognitive communications and to disregard the effects of affective 
communications -- the aesthetic and emotional features of culture and politics -- that 
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which Jim McGuigan maintains is at play in the cultural public sphere (McGuigan, 
2009).
 McGuigan’s update on Habermas entails the bifurcation of democratic 
communications into two discrete but interrelated spheres, the public and the cultural 
public, with the former encompassing cognitive matters, that is, the diffusion of news and 
information, and the latter encompassing the emotional and affective dimension of 
personal and public politics; i.e., the negotiation of lifeworld situations in the individual 
subject’s experiences (and upon which can be mapped the pleasures and pains of mass-
popular culture) (McGuigan, 2005). The cultural public sphere then has implications on 
the public sphere and rational-critical debate can be understood to have some emotive 
underpinnings. This points to the significance of circuits of popular culture and admits 
the importance of cultural production, whether of “high,” “low” or “oppositional” 
character. (And is the relay to the adjoining circuitry of abyss-artistry discussed above).
 However, ruthless commodification of cultural production has led to what we might 
call, "the aesthetization of every day life." That is to say, that culture itself has arguably 
become the logic of late capitalism (Jameson, 1984; Schwengell, 1991; Harvey, 1990); it 
is culture that fires economic growth (Veblen’s long shadow is here particularly 
tenebrous). This fact, of course, bodes poorly for cultural production, and the cultural 
public sphere, especially of a politically-committed or "alternative" stripe, as they are, of 
course, a part and parcel of culture writ large. We are back to the elephant in the room; 
commodification as “alterity’s” double or nemesis. The concern over this state of affairs 
is not new; indeed, it is the perennial bugaboo of the art world. We see shades of this 
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problem in the great Modernist debates about art and autonomy (Burger, 1989; Mann, 
1991). From early avant-garde to FLUXUS and Conceptual Art, many modernist 
movements were grappling with the thorny problems caused by the processes of 
commodification, conceptualized most forcefully as the "culture industry" (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1947): that is, the totalizing effects of monopoly capitalism, which deprive 
the constituent parts of culture—art included—from its critical substance (Burger, 1992).
 Standard consternation about processes of commodification might concern itself, by 
and large, with questions about authenticity (what with efficacy and/or credibility of 
alternative media often perceived as contingent on autonomy), illustrated most starkly in 
the often invoked condemnation of “selling out.” This issue -- the idea of the authentic -- 
is, as noted, operative not just at the level of what amounts to “street cred,” but also, as I 
have mentioned and will try to argue further, is the feather in contemporary invidious-
comparison’s cap. 
 A prominent variant of alternative media perceives itself as a mechanism which can 
help to breakdown hierarchies of meaning-making (Langlois & Dubois 2005, Klein, 
2000); that it can help create free spaces and periods of respite in day-to-day life (de 
Certeau, 1984; Fiske, 1989; Hamilton, 2000; Mouffe, 1988; Rodriguez, 2001). From 
within these spaces, individuals may feel as though they are “active subjects,” 
empowered by feelings of physical or symbolic participation, which in turn may help to 
foment horizontal, non-hierarchical forms of social organization (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987). This is the primary engine of a species of alternative media referred to as tactical 
media (TM).
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 Like the broader heading, “alternative media,” under which it can be filed, tactical 
media is, unsurprisingly, not easy to define. In fact, it is unlikely that there is an apt 
categorical description of tactical media interventions and there certainly is not an 
adequate signifier for the objects which tactical media create and/or employ. Tactical 
media does not labour under an aesthetic rubric or even an instrumental aegis; its product 
is eminently incongruous and variegated. Tactical media is perhaps best conceived of as 
an impulse or as “expressions of dissent” (Renzi, 2008). These expressions are 
deliberately decentralized; horizontally organized, diversified; often ephemeral; and, 
perhaps above all, aspire to autonomist creation and space (Garcia and Lovink, 1997). If 
the term refers to activities that have any similarity at all, it would probably be by virtue 
of the fact that tacticality eschews permanence -- it is the work of guerilla fighters with 
no space of their own. It makes raids into territories dominated by the institutional other. 
This feature of ephemerality is likely due to the work of Michel de Certeau, whose 
writing on tactics characterized them as insinuations into the space or place of the other 
without taking it over (2000). That this idea has won over so many adherents seems to 
testify to a pessimism operating beneath tactical media’s commitments and speaks to its 
historical moment -- there does not appear to be an “outside” to late capitalism; that is, a 
space from which to methodically organize oppositional struggle. Consequently, 
enthusiasm for ephemerality -- small day to day resistances -- enjoys considerable 
popularity (though, as mentioned above, OWS may signal an end to the vogue of TM and 
it may not be premature to say of it that it belonged to the post new left’s political anemia 
in the wake of Reagan and Thatcherism).
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 Activities as dissimilar as detourning billboards or hijacking copyrighted material 
through DJ-ing or video-blogging are understood to be examples of tactical media. In its 
enthusiasm for conscripting art or creative practise to its oppositional ends, it is very 
much a contemporary phenomenon; tactical media theorists and practitioners are children 
of the “Information Age” and are painfully aware that subjectivities are constructed and 
so are eager to counter those representations in mass culture created by what they 
understand, as with alternative media generally, to be an oligopolistic media industry 
(Renzi, 2008; Langlois & Dubois, 2005). But there are two-faces to tactical media: where 
one is artistic, the other is comprised of a close relationship with digital media and 
networked activism.
 Tactical media is often marked by its celebration of media technology that is open-
source (Uzelman, 2005; Boler State, 2008; Critical Art Ensemble, 2001). Many tactical 
media endeavours are wholly indebted to the reticulum of the internet, as with the oft 
cited open-source website Indymedia mentioned above (Pickard, 2006; Langlois, 2005). 
Cyberactivism, or “digital resistance,” forms a good portion of tactical media’s bailiwick 
and manifests both online -- in development of open-source code, computer hacking, or 
in waggish website parodies, such as @TMark’s faux information site on George Bush 
(Daniels, 2009) -- and off. Real world digital activism is seen in the use of decentralized 
digital technologies as concrete networking tools in the formation of itinerant, highly 
mobile anti-corporate and anti-globalization movements (Juris, 2005). These features of 
tactical media reflect the fact that its advent coincides with that of emergent digital 
culture and the so-called information age, but it also reveals something of tactical media’s 
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ontic character. Some species of digital tactical media seem simply to be hymns to the 
hypostatization of the digital age. There are strains of digital tactical media that see 
liberation in the potential and opportunity seemingly promised by technological 
development. In this sense, it bears some resemblance to those theories that myopically 
jettison economic factors and discus the impact of digital mediation on culture as a self-
propelling, and remarkably democratic process (see Deuze, 2006). Even if one disregards 
the obvious problem posed by the digital divide to utopian conceptions of technology, a 
more trenchant take on tactical media’s spiritual affiliation with a mediated worldview--
and its corollaries of de-localization, atomisation, digital networking, and global flows--
recognizes that tactical media, like digital culture writ large, is itself a reflection of 
contemporary economic structures. As Ray and Sholette write in “Whither Tactical 
Media:” “For better and for worse, the nomadic agency of TM  corresponds exactly to the 
de-territorialized spaces of global capitalism” (522). Furthermore, enthusiasm for 
resistance through technological development provides a tenon for the mortise of active 
audience theory: digital resistance sings hosanna to “choice” (read as freedom), 
understood by reception theory to interpellate the audience as “active.” But this “choice,” 
and its profusion, is a hallmark of postmodern capitalism (Ang, 1996). The matter of 
Tactical Media, particularly the notion that it is simply an update of 60s-style 
oppositionality, will be explored further in Chapter 3.
 Lastly, there is the argument, explored in the preceding sections of this chapter, that 
because much of alternative media  percolates in the so-called "underground," it is always 
one step ahead of "mainstream" culture and so can be said to be an agent of "difference" 
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or "distinction” or “cultural capital” (Bourdieu, 1984) and so may simply aid and abet the 
commodification and aesthetization of contemporary culture. It is not outrageous to say 
that most criticisms of this character are indebted to Veblen, whether they are aware of it 
or not. Difference and distinction are precisely those social features that are employed by, 
subsumed within, and valorized by capital (Artz, 2003; Artz, Macek and Cloud, 2006; 
Frank, 1998; Heath & Potter, 2004; Root, 2006). This fact has weighty implications for 
so-called “culture-jamming,” which in many ways prefigures the ascendant mode of 
remix culture, which, despite its admirable hostility to the dominative strictures of 
copyright, is nonetheless the aesthetic manner du jour. This critique is similar to some of 
the criticisms of tactical media, but it applies more directly to oppositional culture which 
conscripts endlessly, and often fetishistically, from vanguard aesthetics, and frequently 
elides content with form. Currently, enthusiasm for pastiche aesthetic and ironical 
distance frequently informs a great deal of the production of oppositional “underground” 
media. A text-book example of this is the magazine Vice, which began as an arts and 
culture zine out of Montréal with a bratty punk rock attitude and has since become a 
glossy fashionista publication out of NYC that maintains a bratty, “punk rock” attitude.26 
This is the arena in which the charge of aestheticizing politics and culture hits home with 
a depressing accuracy. Despite alternative media’s championing of radical politics, it can 
still be party to what has been dubbed “rebel” consumerism (Frank and Weiland, 1997) 
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26 Vice’s attempts, in the last few years, of using foreign corespondents in global hotspots suggests a bid 
toward “sincere,” or more traditional, journalism. Magazines emerging from the aughts and exhibiting the 
quintessential “hipster” aesthetics of irony and pastiche -- instantiated forcefully in the popular trope of 
assembling and displaying anonymous personal photographs (usually of the 70s or early 80s), often 
depicting family vacations and the like -- include, for example, Zine Soup, a collection of international, 
self-published art and graphic zines; Belgian-based A Magazine, a fashion magazine the content of which is 
“curated” for each issue by a guest designer; and London and New York based (notice that all these 
magazines straddle nodal points of globalized capital)‘Sup Magazine, which covers music and culture.
and the creation of incredibly lucrative niche markets (see Kalle Lasn’s Adbusters media 
empire or the wholesale commodification of the punk genre, e.g., Vans Warped Tour, 
Good Charlotte, etc.).  
 This is as good a point as any to return to take up the original thread of this 
chapter: The commodification of rock ‘n’ roll, of hip jive, daddy-O. As I have remarked, 
the prominence of narratives -- of dissent in “difference” and/or transgression -- 
constituting personal liberty or disenthrallment are difficult to fathom. We live in an age 
where former (Republican) Florida Governor and Senator Charlie Crist has recently 
successfully bid for the pardon of 1960s bad-boy Jim Morrison’s alleged genital exposure 
at a Door’s concert some 40 years previous.27 Nobody in pop culture roots for “One-
Dimensional Man.” Not even the Objectivist camp is a proponent of hyperbolic social 
repression emblematized by the stolidity of 1950s suburban living. Which is somewhat 
surprising, what with Ayn Rand’s proponents including Clarence Thomas and Alan 
Greenspan, who can hardly be considered posterboys for technicolor freak flag flyin’. But  
even John Galt advocates rising above the crowd. Or rather, John Galt in particular 
advocates for rising above the contemptible masses. Libertarianism is a fair-weather 
friend and is as likely to turn up at left-wing bacchanals as it is to attend a right-wing fete 
at a five-star restaurant. If the left desires to gloss over libertarianism in conservative 
thought, conservatives aren’t willing to cooperate. Tracing the trajectory of American 
conservatism in the twentieth century, Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming discuss the 
origins of the right-wing flagship magazine, National Review: “[the libertarian editors] of 
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27 Jason Linkins, “Charlie Crist Wins Pardon for Jim Morrison,” The Huffington Post, 12 December 10.
Freeman eventually joined the staff of what became the more widely circulated, anti-
collectivist periodical. Their antistatist, individualist creed remained essential to the 
moral teachings of the National Review--and was then imperfectly transfered to the 
conservative politics of the 1960s” (3).   
 Individualism is championed in both liberal and conservative camps, though by 
virtue of some sort of wishful thinking, it is often presupposed that there is actually some 
extant straw man conservative, rubbing her knuckles and giving dark obeisance to the 
gods of False Needs and Social Control. There is no cabal of bowtie-wearing 
conservatives yearning for control of the plebs. Indeed, conservatives are happy to exploit  
the liberal public sphere’s dependable injunction to toleration, as a quick glimpse at the 
pro-life camp’s catalogue of horrors quickly attests. They too relish the abyss-artistry-
redemption compact. Indeed, the bogeyman of social pressure for staid, conformist 
decorum is a bi-partisan, inverted ex nomination of capitalist fluidity and fungibility. One 
would think that, what with all the blockbuster movies celebrating the triumph of the 
“little guy” over the evil corporation, we surely have, by now, clued into the fact that we 
really do root for the awkward loner, whose outsider status marks her as the protagonist/
rebel. Capitalism happily admits anti-capitalist sentiment in its entertainments and 
diversions. Mark Fisher pace Zizek gives the example of Disney’s Wall-E, the animated 
feature in which a future world has been laid to waste by consumerism and corporations, 
and notes that this “gestural anti-capitalism” reinforces “capitalist realism” (12). To parse 




Commodification and the Knavish Trickery of “the Authentic”
(Loki’s Slippery Return)
I remember the time I went to my first rare-book 
fair and saw how the first editions of Thoreau 
and Whitman and Crane had been carefully 
packaged in the heat-shrunk plastic with the 
price tags on the inside. Somehow the simple 
addition of air-tight plastic bags had transformed 
the books from vehicles of liveliness into 
commodities. 
-- Lewis Hyde, The Gift, 1971
Bowie’s “Changes” in a BMW ad... Think I’m 
gonna puke.
-- Mike McDonald, of seminal Canadian Prairie -
punk outfit, Jnr. Gone Wild, Facebook “Wall” Post, 
Oct, 2011
We are a Faustian age determined to meet the 
Lord or the Devil before we are done, and the 
ineluctable ore of the authentic is our only key to 
the lock.
- Norman Mailer, 1971
A. Cultural Objects and Commodity Fetishism 
 According to Martha Ertman and John Williams, “‘commodification’ is the term 
scholars use to describe the process of something becoming understood as a commodity, 
as well as the state of affairs once this has taken place” (1).  It is arguable that the “state 
of affairs” resultant from the ascension of market-place logics is the global ubiquity of 
generalized commodity production and a prevalent enthusiasm for the liberal conception 
of freedom as ostensibly enshrined in processes of commodification. Contrary to the 
celebration of market-place capitalism, however, is the suspicion that there are damaging 
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externalities effected by the process of commodification and that “the harms of 
commodification take many forms -- from dignitary to economic exploitation, from 
changes in people’s material lives to changes in the discourse through which their self-
conception is constructed and survives” (Radin and Sunder 9). It is this last point which 
concerns us here; that is, the effects of commodification on culture and meaning making. 
Why is it that we understand without any further elaboration the quotes above, wherein 
David Bowie selling “Changes” to BMW induces vomit and Lewis Hyde decries the 
transformation of a book -- a well-loved classic, no less -- into a “commodity.” Indeed, 
Hyde’s larger point is that art operates differently in a “gift economy” than it does under 
marketplace logics and the next sentence, missing from the epigraph above, reads: “In 
commodity exchange it’s as if the buyer and seller were both in plastic bags; there’s none 
of the contact of the gift exchange” (Gift 12). What is the damage wrought by these 
prophylactic bags? What do they represent? We know what is being suggested here, but 
to define exactly what Hyde means would be a harder task. 
 “Cultural commodification” -- refracted blindingly off the shiny sheen of Hyde’s 
plastic sacs -- comprises a highly contested terrain that has been commented on ad 
infinitum. Terms, catchwords and locutions for the commodification of culture are legion 
and attest to both the scrutiny it has been afforded as well as its obduracy, its refusal of 
resolution: reification; recuperation; “sell-out;” “mainstream” vs “alternative;” cultural 
appropriation; the possibility or impossibility of autonomy in art; pop culture; the 
spectacle, the culture industry, etc. Given these vexing features of commodification, a 
return to basics, so to speak, seems advisable. Pursuant to the inquiry that is here being 
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attempted, it is necessary to perform a brief reckoning with Marx’s conception of 
commodity fetishism in order to furnish notions of cultural commodification with robust 
designations and terminology.
 In “Commodities and the Politics of Value,” Arjun Appadurai makes the incisive 
observation that the term “commodities” is increasingly divorced from its connotation as 
understood by Marx and classical economists; it has been eclipsed, claims Appadurai, by 
the neoclassical conception of “goods.”  The value of a good is often conceived of in 
terms of utility, following marginal utility theory, thereby obscuring a labour theory of 
value. Consequently, as Appadurai notes, “in most contemporary [understandings], 
commodities are special kinds of manufactured goods (or services), which are associated 
only with capitalist modes of production and are thus only to be found where capitalism 
has penetrated” (35). This, of course, evokes disputations as to the extent to which 
capitalism has “penetrated” or expanded worldwide. Without following Appadurai down 
the rabbit-hole of globalization to a debate about marginal, barter and gift economies, we 
can acknowledge that his observation serves to draw our attention to the often incomplete 
perception of what constitutes a commodity. Marx does not appear to have made the 
claim that the commodity form bursts from the head of a product or good fully formed 
under capitalist conditions, rather that commodity production as a basic building block of 
economic life presupposes capitalist conditions. Moreover, despite the fact that in some 
quarters, the New Gospel proclaims that we have reached the end of history and that the 
free market and liberal democracy are globally triumphant,28 the fact remains that labour 
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28 The recessions beginning in 2008 have deeply troubled this narrative. Moreover, the emergence of OWS, 
a movement which has put economic issues front and centre, as of the time of this writing, seems to offer 
the hope of further contestation of capitalist triumphalism.
is often performed under duress. This contradicts Marx’s observation that “the transition 
to the capitalist mode of production is completed only when direct force and the coercive 
force of external economic conditions are used only in exceptional cases”29 (Taussig 22). 
This can hardly be said of global working conditions and it is highly debatable as to 
whether it is even true in the global north. Nonetheless, it is not a stretch to agree, in 
general, with the cheerleaders of free marketers that capitalism is in full global bloom, 
whether or not it has fully penetrated those small bastions of pre-modern enclaves or 
smattering of socialist states (which would likely be “Third Way” governments anyhow). 
In either case, by noting this contemporary deficiency in perceiving commodity forms, 
Appadurai highlights the centrality of Marx’s conception of commodity fetish to 
unpacking processes of commodification. 
 Marx writes in Capital that “[a] commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial 
thing, and is easily understood” (81). Upon closer inspection, however, this triviality is 
revealed to be a falsehood: “analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, 
abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (81). Although the 
properties of a commodity that satisfy a human need -- its use-value -- seem transparent, 
they are bound-up with labour and exchange-value in such a way as to make the 
seemingly unambiguous nature of the commodity chimerical or misleading. In fact, 
commodities, as a product of human labour, are social things that are simultaneously 
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29 This observation refers to the “naturalization” of working conditions and the emergence of the working 
class. However, the fact remains that estimates for contemporary global slavery number roughly 27 million 
(see http://abolitionmedia.org/about-us/modern-slavery-statistics). In Marxist analysis, slavery is simply not 
productive enough to properly aid in capitalist accumulation. Moreover, slavery, as the engine that fired 
“primitive accumulation,” is seen as capitalism’s starting point, not a precondition of its continued 
functioning. For an illuminating examination of this issue see Robin Blackburn’s The Making of New World 
Slavery: from the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800. Verso, 1997 
perceptible and imperceptible to the human senses (Marx, Capital 83). Whereas a use-
value, a commodity’s utility, is that which causes one to purchase a commodity (utility 
thus resides in useless leisure items such as positional goods), its exchange-value is the 
quantitative measure of the commodity’s value as determined in relation to other 
commodities. Commodity production then, must be production of exchange. This fact is 
illustrated well by Michael Taussig who writes in The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in 
South America that 
As a commodity [a] shoe has the exchange-value function: it can 
generate profit for its owner and seller over and above the use-value 
that it holds for the person who eventually buys and wears it. In its 
exchange-value the shoe is qualitatively identical with any other 
commodity, no matter how much they may differ in terms of their use-
value properties. [...] By virtue of this abstraction, which is based on 
market exchange and the universal equivalence of money, a palace is 
equal to a certain number of shoes, just as a pair of shoes is equal to a 
certain fraction of an animal’s hide. (25 - 26)
This exchange-value, although determined by a given commodity’s relationship to other 
commodities, is the result of human labour. As commodities have both use- and 
exchange-value so too does labour have a two-fold character. “Concrete-labour” and 
“abstract-labour” correspond with the production of, respectively, use-value and 
exchange-value in a commodity (Marx, Capital 48 - 49, 84). Where concrete-labour 
refers to the skills and expertise needed to produce a given object, abstract-labour refers 
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to human labour-power generally (Marx, Capital 49 - 50). It is because abstract-labour 
can be reduced to a uniform quality that concrete-labour can be made comparable and the 
ensuing products can be exchanged (Marx, Capital 49 - 51). Again, Taussig casts Marx’s 
ideas into sharp relief and hints at the spectre of surplus value: “What the capitalist 
acquires in buying the commodity of labour power as an exchange-value is the right to 
deploy the use-value of labour as the intelligent and creative capacity of human beings to 
produce more use-values than those that are reconverted into commodities as the 
wage” (26). This reduction of labour-power, expressed as abstract-labour, is measured by 
the “socially average” time it takes to produce a commodity and its relationship to the 
production of other commodities (Marx, Capital 49 - 53). The adage “time is money” 
takes on a sinister sheen. 
 A commodity is therefore a misleading or “mysterious” object
simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to 
them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; 
because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own 
labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between 
themselves, but between the products of their labour [...] When we 
bring the products of our labour into relation with each other as values, 
it is not because we see in these articles the material receptacles of 
homogenous human labour. [Rather, through exchange we equate as 
values our different products and unconsciously impute this value onto 
the different kinds of labour expended on them]. Value, therefore, does 
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not stalk about with a label describing what it is. [It is value] that 
converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. (Marx, Capital 83 - 
85)
The implications of these observations are manifold, but the two that are most obvious 
are those that are germane to situating cultural commodification in a manner relevant to 
my meditations on oppositional cultural production. The first, the matter of surplus value, 
though bound up with the forthcoming point, will be treated, as far as it is possible, 
independently. The second, the corollary of commodity fetishism, will inform discussion 
of cultural hegemony and ideology, which will underlay the concerns of the end of this 
section (and will have to be considered against those issues addressed in chapter 1).  
Although surplus value is significant and highly imbricated with commodity fetishism, it 
does not relay to subsequent examination of cultural commodification as readily as do the 
consequences of commodity fetishism and so will be dealt with first. 
 The abstraction of labour allows for the homogenization of labour power -- due to 
its flattening or reduction of particular or specialized concrete labour so that labour itself 
may be commodified -- and is what causes the separation of a worker from her or his 
creative impulses; it is that which makes labour instrumental. Moreover, as indicated by 
the Taussig quote above, it also enables capital or the capitalist system to control the 
labour of workers. Deprived of sufficient capital to control production, the ostensibly free 
worker can be forced to labour longer than is necessary to produce goods that are 
essential for her or his survival: “the hidden mechanism that ensures the creation of 
surplus out of a situation that appears as nothing more than the fair exchange of 
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equivalents [the purchasing of labour power] is the movement back and forth of labour as 
an exchange-value and labour as a use-value” (Taussig 27). Not only is this a situation in 
which the worker is divorced from the fruit of their labours (what does this mean for the 
“creative worker”?), but it almost guarantees that s/he will never be in control of the 
means of production. For the cultural worker,30 this has heavy consequences as it means 
that it is unlikely that she will be able to create culturally dominant representations which 
attest to or speak to meanings pertinent to her life, practise and/or experience. 
 Carl Freedman concisely summarizes the corollaries of capital’s withdrawal of 
surplus value from wage earners: 
Under capitalism, the wages paid to the proletariat must necessarily be 
of lesser value than the commodities produced by them. The differential 
is surplus value, and its extraction from the working class is what 
makes profit itself possible. In order for capitalism to function, 
however, surplus-value must not only be not only extracted but also 
realized, that is, transformed into money by the sale of commodities on 
the market; yet, by definition, the workers themselves, whose only cash 
is their wages, lack the resources to buy all the commodities they have 
made. (5)
Consequently, those artisans, carpenters, etc creating the creature comforts of lounges and 
parlours for business elites will never even be permitted to see the fruits of their labours, 
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30 The matter of labour, in the information sector or “knowledge economy,” becoming “immaterial labour” 
that is comprised of symbols, information or affect and is often routed through information and 
communications technologies, finds resonance in Marx’s conception of the “general intellect.” See the next 
section below.
let alone enjoy them, in the penthouse suites of skyscrapers in mid-town Manhattan (or, 
as Saskia Sassen points out in “Whose City is it? Globalization and the Formation of 
New Claims,” any other nodal point, i.e., mega trading centre, in the transnational space 
of international high finance and business. New York becomes Tokyo becomes London 
becomes Paris). This is the yawning chasm between a labourer and the result of her 
labour: she is denied the harvest of her work. Similarly, within the creative industries it 
means that artistic or creative labour will be directed by those who own the means of 
production ensuring that the separation between labourer and her or his product transpires 
long before the commodity item is completed. This seems most obvious in contemporary 
cinema where teams of digital special effects workers will toil for months on a scene that 
will not run longer than a minute or two at the behest of a film’s director (at the behest of 
the producers at the behest of the film studio), but it is true, to varying extents, in all 
creative industries, from music to writing to drama. 
 This situation becomes incredibly complex and muddied in the arena of visual 
fine art wherein a given artwork, especially those that comment on the social, often 
appear to be sui generis, which gives them a sheen of authorial freedom. Created by the 
lone artist, visual art works easily re-inscribe the myth of the individual genius somehow 
working outside the material conditions of her historical moment. However, the two 
necessary features of fine art industries -- i.e., the milieu in which her productions will be 
displayed -- are criticism and exhibition, which themselves are vulnerable to the law of 
value, i.e., commodified. As Deborah Root writes, “a certain luster surrounds the art 
object and those who create, market, and collect high art, and this luster draws attention 
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away from the extent to which art must conform to market forces” (139). Why are certain 
works valorized above others? What determines what works will and will not be seen? 
 While the problems posed by the fine art world appear to be qualifiably different 
than more obvious examples of exploitation of cultural workers (say, the legions of 
designers working in advertising or the video-game industry, etc) it should be obvious 
that they, like the selfsame problems workers face in other creative industries, are a result 
of the conditions necessary to produce surplus-value.31 Again, not only are workers not in 
control of the means of production they are not in control of the fruits of their own labour. 
This dissociation of a worker from her work is a necessary component of the conditions 
which ensure the creation of surplus-value. Marx called this alienated labour (Marx, 
Alienated). This alienation, under capitalist conditions, is a vicious circle that is the result 
of the productive forces it both demands and effects: “the worker produces capital and 
capital produces him. Man is simply a worker, and as a worker his human qualities only 
exist for the sake of capital which is alien to him. [...] The existence of capital is his 
existence [... and] it determines the content of his life independently of him” (Marx, 
Private 110 - 111). The creative worker must labour to exist (in both practical and, under 
capitalism, metaphysical terms!) but will never have the power to determine the character 
of her work or to recoup the spirit of her labour once it has been imputed into a 
commodity to give it value. The point that is being driven at here, as it relates specifically  
to creative enterprise, is succinctly and eloquently phrased by Salmon Rushdie, of all 
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31 This problem is ramified by digital networks -- see the next section below -- and the increasing use of 
“free” labour in the form of recent graduates who must work as interns to properly bolster their resume for 
the highly competitive marketplace of the creative economies. See “Writers Explain What It's Like Toiling 
on the Content Farm.” Media Shift, 21 July 2010 and Ross Perlin, Intern Nation, New York: Verso, 2011.
people, who asserts that, “those who do not have power over the story that dominates 
their lives, power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as times 
change, truly are powerless” (as qtd in Radin and Sunder 19). For creative labourers, this 
is, quite simply, the problem posed by power relations which delimit possibilities of 
verisimilitudinous representation and taint the process of meaning making. How might 
cultural producers negotiate this problem (and to what extent might they actually identify 
it as a problem)? 
 Returning now to the issue of commodity fetishism, it is telling that Marx uses the 
term “social hieroglyphic” to denote the inscrutable presence of value in a commodity, 
for a commodity’s value has little to nothing to do with its perceptible or material 
features. It is a commodity’s supra-sensible qualities that endow it with value (created by 
the requisite labour needed, which is embedded in the object) (Marx, Capital 83). These 
qualities are, of course, invisible, which is why they require special interpretation; thus 
the likening of the commodity to a hieroglyphic. The remarkable thing about this 
observation, as hinted at earlier, is that it points to the fact that the aspect of this supra-
sensible quality that is appreciable in the commodity is expressed through a commodity’s 
price (Marx, Capital 84 - 85). This has the profound implication of collapsing all the 
labour, social co-operation, and specialized skills that are necessary for a commodity’s 
production into its exchange-value (Marx, Capital 84 - 87). This, the displacement of 
human labour into things is the fetish character of commodities. The seemingly objective 
status of the exchange-value of commodities, which is exactly that around which social 
activity is mediated, causes the process of commodification to seem natural. This is what 
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Marx is referring to when he claims, as quoted earlier, “the relation of the producers to 
the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not 
between themselves, but between the products of their labour” (Marx, Capital 83). This, 
of course, configures society in a very specific way, granting the value of human relations 
to objects or things. Taussig does not spare the acid when he describes what this means 
for the larger social body:
Fetishism denotes the attribution of life, autonomy, power, and even 
dominance to otherwise inanimate objects and presupposes the draining 
of these qualities from the human actors who bestow the attribution. 
[...] Social relationships are dismembered and appear to dissolve into 
relationships between mere things -- the products of labour exchanged 
on the market -- so that the sociology of exploitation masquerades as a 
natural relationship between systemic artifacts. Instead of man being 
the aim of production, production has become the aim of man and 
wealth the aim of production... (31- 32)
This is a situation that appears almost impossible to step outside of; escape seems 
inconceivable: “[Capital] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, 
of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical 
calculation” (Marx & Engels 222). Personal worth and social relations are reduced to 
exchange-value. The idea that capitalism has “no outside” is not a new one, but its 
ramifications are given stark articulation by Mark Fisher’s conception of “capitalist 
realism,” (alluded to in the conclusion of Chapter 1 above) as “what is left when beliefs 
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have collapsed at the level of ritual or symbolic elaboration, and all that is left is the 
consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and the relics” (4). Capitalist realism 
cautions against confronting its abyssal latitude or scope, as to do so would be to 
mobilize the “fatal abstractions” of the past; “capitalist realism presents itself as a shield 
protecting us from the perils posed by belief itself” (Fisher 5). 
 Dissatisfaction at this state of affairs seems difficult to articulate: one is already 
implicated into this system of social relations and, even if someone were able to 
somehow to “step outside,” to arrive at the exterior of this system, what could be said of 
the cultural production that might be created from this position that would allow 
reprovable expression? Would these expressions no longer be commodities? Would their 
rebukes or reprehension be meaningful if they were commodities? How do cultural 
producers, particularly those with an oppositional mandate, negotiate these questions? 
The problems of false consciousness, ideology, recuperation and reification are here 
raising their heads, which I will briefly address in the next section (although it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to properly follow the trails suggested by these terms). By shifting 
into this arena, we begin to see the contours of subsequent Marxist theorizing of Marxist 
conceptions. As Ben Agger writes, “What Marx called commodity fetishism, which he 
argued is built into every commodified relationship in which workers exchange their 
power for a living wage, foreshadows cultural hegemony and domination in that it has in 
common with them the false representation and hence endorsement of existing social 
relationships” (original emphasis 92).
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 The concerns of Lukács, Althusser and the Frankfurt school are anticipated by 
Marx in a famous and frequently evoked passage from the “Preface to a Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy:” “The mode of production of the material means of 
existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their 
social existence that determines their consciousness” (217 - 218). This sets the template 
for ensuing considerations, which are summarized aptly by Christain Fuchs, who notes 
that 
Louis Althusser stressed that ideology is a “system of the ideas and 
representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group.” 
“Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence.” The Frankfurt School argued that with the 
establishment of 20th century capitalism, mass media, and culture have 
taken on commodity form in a way that simplifies and distorts reality 
and keeps people calm by preoccupying them with light entertainment. 
Consciousness becomes instrumental like any machinery; reflection 
gets substituted by standardized automatic reactions so that potential 
alternatives to existing society are no longer imaginable and therefore 
become unlikely. (32)
How can anyone, particularly cultural producers who may desire to comment on the 
social in a critical manner, evade the problems resultant from commodity fetishism and 
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the social structure it enacts? Especially when consciousness itself has become 
“instrumental”?
 These issues take on a particular salience in the arena of popular music, as already 
noted, where, since the 1960s, commerce has been considered inimical to “authentic” 
rock music (or hip hop, metal, etc). Evidently, critique of “exchange-value” culture has 
become de rigueur even in massified corporate popular culture. Contrary to the Frankfurt 
school critique, which maintained that popular music foisted upon its public repetitive 
narratives of idealized social relations and naturalized material conditions, it appears as 
though an oppositional streak is now a component part of popular music and its 
saleability (Seiler 204). As Cotten Seiler notes, “the rock artist [uses] art to indict and to 
locate a way out of the rationalized system of domination effected by modern capitalism. 
The more profound and fertile the opposition, the greater the value of the art” (207). It is 
worth noting here that, as we have seen through Marx’s unpacking of the commodity 
form, talk of value is almost meaningless outside of the relational field of exchange-
value. Indeed, Seiler goes on to observe that “although popular music has demonstrated 
[an ability] to inspire and anchor counterhegemonic sensibilities, the alacrity and success 
with which the culture industry has marketed [popular music’s] affective structure and 
channelled those sensibilities toward consumption must be soberly acknowledged” (222). 
Given that popular music can be mustered as a stand-in for other forms of cultural 
production, what are we to make of the evolution of commodification? Commodified 
cultural forms appear to have a de facto oppositional built-in character. Again, alterity is 
not so rare a precious metal as is presupposed (or, put another way, the lens through 
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which it is generally perceived is faulty). This seems to further muddy the waters for the 
politically committed cultural producer, but it is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored. 
However, it is worth asking what, exactly, is transpiring when dissent or opposition is 
absorbed into the cash nexus? When Seiler mentions the successful marketization of 
“antihegemonic sensibilities,” what does this mean? Why is it successful? I believe that 
the mater of authenticity -- as I discussed it in chapter 1 -- has considerable bearing on 
the problem of commodified transgression. Authenticity does not provide a pat answer to 
this problem, but I would like to make the argument that it is a serviceable loadstar for a 
discerning examination of oppositional cultural production and the matter of 
commodification. 
B. Hegemony, Publicity, Individualism in Modernity, and Loki as Patron Saint of 
     The Authentic
 B.1) The Problem of Hegemony
 The benefit of Marx’s analysis of commodification is that it supplies an 
explanation of the conditions from which the problem posed by the authentic emerges. 
Or, put another way, the authentic, in the form of cultural capital, is the symptom of a 
social lack resultant from capitalist social relations. Veblenian predation, refracted 
through the abyss-artistry-redeemer compact, may provide clues as to the “how” of 
authenticity, but it is Marx’s analysis of the mode of production from which the liberal 
sphere arises -- and the attendant understanding of individuality -- that supplies the 
“why.” But it simultaneously presents the problem posed by conceptions of hegemony by 
trading on the notion of false consciousness. 
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 The rise of capitalism fostered the rise of the bourgeois public sphere. Arguably, 
the bourgeois liberal public sphere is the apotheosized expression of Eric Hobsbawm’s 
schematic for the rise of modernity, the leavening agent of which he calls dual revolution, 
comprising the French political and English Industrial revolutions: “the great revolution 
of 1789 - 1848 was the triumph not of ‘industry’ as such, but of capitalist industry; not of 
liberty and equality in general, but of middle class or ‘bourgeois’ liberal society” (italics 
in original 13). The post-feudal citizen of the nation state imagines herself free to 
assemble, via representative means, and argue over matters belonging to commodified 
information; that is, information (ostensibly) free of the influence of the state, church or 
sovereign. 
 Whatever other falsehoods attend the liberal public sphere, the notion that it is 
populated by sovereign selves is maybe its most confounding. Individualism is “the 
mainspring of bourgeois/capitalist philosophy; the doctrine that individuals are the 
starting point and source of human action. That is, each person ‘owns’ his or her 
capacities (especially their capacity to labour) and is not in debt to society (or feudal 
overlord) for these capacities [...] This ‘freedom’ of the individual, then, is what underlies 
the operation of the ‘free’ market economy” (Hartley 113). The idea of false 
consciousness tells us that liberal selves are part of a capitalist matrix wherein they are 
thingified; where living social labour, which comprises the lifeworld -- nature, other 
people, the labourers themselves -- stands apart from oneself. The subject is cleaved from 
the object and life is lived passively. This is exchange-value culture.
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 This idea has been taken up extensively since Marx’s time, as critics attempted to 
wrestle with the frustrating fact that, in the absence of violent coercion, subordinate 
classes have appeared to acquiesce to domination and exploitation.32 Hegemonic 
domination is thought to have as it its trump card an interpolating ideology which 
conceals aspects of social relations by making oppression appear as a natural fact. It is 
not difficult to see how Marx’s conception of the commodity fetish is conscripted as 
explicating agent to this puzzle. But there is simultaneously a flip side to this equation 
that provides a way out for the seemingly intractable problem of alienated life. Indeed, it 
is a sleight-of-hand that belongs to Marxist analysis at its seemingly most totalizing. The 
social conditions in which one is imprisoned are simultaneously the locus or causal agent 
for one’s eventual liberation: the injustices within social reality can only be overturned 
within social reality itself (i.e., they cannot be fixed from philosophical prescription, but 
from within the conflict arising from social conditions, i.e., the point is not to interpret 
the world, it is to change it (Marx, Ideology 123). A dialectical conception of history 
maintains that self-fulfillment is born in self-destruction; that emancipatory projects are 
historical projects which arise out of both their own experience and their execution and/
or realization (I am here conveniently shearing Marxist dialectics from the much thornier 
issue of eventual material equality belonging to the world historical ascension of an 
organized working class, etc., etc.). The point being mustered is that material changes 
attend the forward march of history. With material changes comes changes in social 
relations: in the act of production, “the producers change, too, in that they bring out new 
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32 See, for instance, Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, London: Hutchinson 
University Library, 1973; Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon, 1975; Louis Althusser & 
Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital: New York: Verso, 2009.
qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, develop 
new powers and new ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new 
language” (Marx, Grundrisse 494). A quick reckoning with contemporary modes of 
cultural production will be the last link in the argument I am trying to rally in order to 
show that the yearning for authenticity attends contemporary alterity and oppositional 
cultural production.
 I am not interested, therefore, in tracing the arguments for and against hegemony. 
I would like to avoid, on the one hand, theories of hegemony which leach the subject of 
agency by positing her behaviour as irrational; on the other hand, I am not interested in 
celebrating the ridiculousness of active audience theory, which, to my mind, is merely a 
cover for an ailing and timorous left (see chapter 3). To sail between the Charybdis of 
hegemony and Scylla of celebration of quotidian minutiae is no easy feat. I don’t pretend 
that the listing and leaking vessel I’m navigating may be dashed upon the rocks of 
considered wisdom belonging to antecedent theorizing.  But given that I have suggested 
several times over that the explanations for consumer capitalism that overlook the 
obviousness and prevalence of vibrant (ostensive) individualism, as against the duped 
masses, are deficient, it behooves me to attend to an exploration of the circuit of cultural 
production which does not propose irrationality on the part of its actors. Consequently, I 
want to try to make an end-run around the vexing argument of hegemony by pointing to 
invidious distinction as manifesting in our current historical moment as a rational desire 
for authenticity. Moreover, this desire is perhaps at its most vibrant within the framework 
of oppositional cultural production as opposition to what might be called “exchange-
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value” culture is precisely that which is read as genuine or authentic. As noted above, this 
requires that the means of contemporary cultural production be considered.
 
B.2) The General Intellect
 The rise of post-Fordism in the global north was akin to an orotund and self-
satisfied capitalist dog and pony show, wherein capitalism’s extraordinary ability to adapt 
and evolve was exhibited over and over again to the beaming smiles and monkey 
clapping of capital’s functionaries. Post-Fordism is marked, primarily, by decentralized 
work forces, flexible labour processes, new technologies, highly skilled workforces, and 
“ample opportunities for workers to become capitalists” (Antonio & Bonanno 21). Post-
Fordism seems to present a picture wherein workers do, in fact, own a share in the means 
of production: knowledge. This situation is anticipated by Marx in a section of the 
Grundrisse known as “The Fragment on Machines,” expounded upon to withering effect 
in Nick Dyer-Witheford’s Cyber-Marx. In the fragment, Marx suggests that, counter to 
the standard labour theory of value, surplus value will be created by two interrelated 
components. The first, “scientific labour,” is best understood as technological expertise, 
while the second, productive organization, is articulated as “social combination” (Marx 
Grundrisse 705). The crucial element in activating these forces in concord will be the 
“social intellect,” or, in Marx’s singularly apt phrase, “the general productive forces of 
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the social brain”33 (Marx Grundrisse 709). Dyer-Witheford highlights a passage from the 
Grundrisse which succinctly explains that “the main expression of the power of "general 
intellect" is the increasing importance of machinery - "fixed capital" - in social 
organisation” (219): 
[Machines are] organs of the human brain, created by the human hand: the 
power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital 
indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct 
force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the 
process of social life itself have come under the control of the general 
intellect and have been transformed in accordance with it. (Marx, 
Grundrisse 706)
This presages momentous alterations in social conditions, including a dire 
reconfiguration of publicity.  As Jack Bratich notes, “living labor, routed through the 
General Intellect, contains the social cooperation necessary for capitalist production, but 
is irreducible to it” (8). The public sphere, polis of the abstracted citizen, becomes 
networked, abstract knowledge, belonging to processes of production:
Thought ceases to be an invisible, private activity and becomes something 
exterior, even public, as it breaks into the productive process. [...] The 
public [...] is rooted in social production and collaborative material 
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33 This observation is important to some strains of Italian Autonomism, where it is noted that intellectual 
labour has become a mainstay of post-fordist production, and that, further, intellectual labour is not located 
only in machinery but in the networked bodies of living subjects who work with them. From this 
observation emerges speculation on the possibility of a public sphere outside the state and a political 
community contingent on an emancipated or “autonomous” general intellect. See Paolo Virno, “Notes on 
the 'General Intellect.’” Marxism Beyond Marxism, eds. Saree Makdisi et.al., New York: Routledge, 1996, 
pp. 265-272
processes, not in any imaginary identification with the topos of the nation-
state. Rather than seek out a democracy formed in public discussion, this 
version of intellectuality begins with the material constitution of 
democracy, that is in the already existing commons of production and 
reproduction (whether this takes the form of labor, political experiments, 
cultural projects, etc.). The public sphere is the political form that emerges 
from these networks of living cognitive labor, not out of the deliberative 
mental work of consensual decision-making. (9)
This translocates the issue of publicness into the very mediums in which information is 
conveyed and objects created; morphing, contorting content and the meaning of content. 
It reconfigures the constellations within which expression is given reign. It reroutes it 
along public tracks. Tracks which carry along with them private freight, which they 
cannot help but hurl forward toward their destination of publicness, by dint of the 
cognitive and affective labour inherent to the very rails on which they locomote. Or, as in 
the droll observation of Blake Stimson, “What ‘the medium is the message’ has always 
meant is that the medium itself is modernity’s boot camp, the place where subjectivity is 
broken down or disaggregated or defragged and then reassembled and reordered – into its 
typographic or Frankensteinian or Metropolis-like composite forms or, for our purposes, 
into its internet or digital forms – in order to effect a psychosocial reorganisation on the 
model of the machine” (Stimson 641). The “infernal machine” that is capitalist 
modernity, transmogrifies alleys and avenues of human expression into massive coram 
populo boulevards. Where once private pathways might have lead to large public squares 
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(or at least traffic circles), intended for the deliberations of the public sphere, these new 
vectors which exact publicity as the toll which ensures their maintenance replace 
publicity as an intentional space with publicity as an expression and extension of 
productive logics.
B.3) Individualism and Loki’s Authentic
 The result of this set of circumstances may alter the tenor of cultural production, 
as the marketplace and the general intellect commingle and fuse, further aggravating the 
already vexed distinction of private/public (setting the stage for new species of abyss-
redemption). But it does not point to an evasion of the problems posed by ostensible 
alterity broached in chapter 1. Indeed, if anything, it further underscores the yearning for 
individuality amongst liberalism’s atomised herds, which is still played off against that 
secret, the name of which no one will speak, that everyone is flagrantly seeking this 
selfsame succor. “What we are dealing with now,” writes Mark Fisher, 
is not the incorporation of materials that previously seemed to posses 
subversive potentials, but instead, their precorporation: the pre-emptive 
formatting and shaping of desires, aspirations and hopes by capitalist 
culture. Witness, for instance, the establishment of settled ‘alternative’ or 
‘independent’ zones, which endlessly repeat older gestures of rebellion 
and contestation as if for the first time. ‘Alternative’ and ‘independent’ 
don’t designate something outside mainstream culture; rather, they are 
styles, in fact the dominant styles, within the mainstream. (9)
79
But this might be too hasty a verdict. Surely the search for “alterity” and “independence” 
have a history that extends past the post-war decades, in particular, the 1990s, where the 
ubiquity of patented “alternative” culture reached its most richly incongruous apex. The 
boom in counterculture occurring most visibly in the 1960s was, after all, simply 
resuscitating a host of distinctly modernist concerns and mannerisms, echoing off of 
romanticism, the flâneur, and other 18th century trends: flamboyance, a celebration of 
sensuousness and aesthetics, and a fraught relationship with the urban/rural split. This last 
point is the item of modernity, the reverberations of which we are still contending with, 
that underlie much of the character of the authentic. It is prefigured in the writings of 
such eminently modern figures as Goethe and Rousseau. Rousseau’s wrestling with the 
corrupting and deforming aspects of “civilization” belong to a time where “civilization” 
connotes the productive forces of ascendant urban space, where new organization for the 
deployment of labour was beginning to reform the world. The cities were not yet home to 
the dark, satanic mills of a fully-fledged industrial revolution, but the productive forces of 
urban centres were in harness. The sundering from traditional life, of what is often 
wielded in conceptions of a prelapsarian authentic, is the chasm represented by the rural 
pastoral and the urban upheaval. This is not entirely caricature. As Robert Heilbroner 
notes, “[in the 17th century], a system of personal gain has not yet taken root. [...] a 
separate, self-contained economic world has not yet lifted itself from its social context. 
The world of practical affairs is inextricably mixed up with the world of political, social, 
and religious life. Until the two worlds separate, there will be nothing that resembles the 
tempo and the feeling of modern life. And for the two to separate, a long and bitter 
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struggle must take place” (24). This turmoil ensuing from this struggle is perhaps best 
encapsulated in the oft-quoted passage of Marx, wherein he paints a picture of capitalist 
modernity: “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed one become antiquated before 
they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last 
are forced to face [...] the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow 
men” (as qtd in Berman 21).
  Perhaps the rise of postmodernity was supposed to signal the end of this struggle. 
The convulsions wrought by Enlightenment rationality cannot further oppress skeptical 
minds attuned to difference and metaphysical presumptions. We now see through the lie 
perpetuated by grand narratives. Humanity is no hero of liberty, etc., etc.34  I would 
submit, however, that contemporary conditions are not necessarily a place where some 
sort of detente has been made with constant flux, where the drive for individuation stems 
from a different tension than those belonging to the modernist tragedy of development. 
Modern development might reveal itself in contemporary coordinates as slicker and faster 
iterations of itself, almost indistinguishable from its European origins, but it is still a child 
of modernity and Hobsbawm’s dual revolution: “The industrial revolution was not indeed 
an episode with a beginning and an end. To ask when it was “complete” is senseless, for 
its essence was that henceforth revolutionary change became the norm” ( 44). Marshall 
Berman makes the convincing claim the tribulations arising from a state of constant 
revolution are Faustian in nature and that, indeed, Goethe’s Faust is an early apologue for 
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34 Although, as John Durham Peters points out, “the postmodernist claim that there can be no more grand 
narratives about history presupposes a pretty comprehensive grasp of history’s direction -- precisely the 
kind of epistemological privilege that many postmodernists want to deny” (4).
capitalist development: “Faust fights the old world, the world he has cut himself loose 
from, by transforming himself into a new type of person, one who asserts and knows 
himself, [...] who becomes himself through restless, endless self-expansion” (58). 
Individual development is as fraught a project as humankind’s development. The drive 
for individualism is no more obscene than modernity itself. It is obtuse to say of 
modernity that it is “bad.” So too is it preposterous to say that individualism can be 
placed within an insipid moral binary of evil and virtuous. Individual flourishing is, after 
all, widely held to be a higher good. The framework within which individual flourishing 
might come to pass, however, is not instantiated in capitalist modernity, wherein manifold 
noxiousness attends individualist unfolding. There can be no doubt that “endless self-
expansion” carries with it heavy burdens. (But it is worth remembering that patriarchal 
feudalism is not so great either). 
 The revolutionary reconfiguring of the self and society that is the hallmark of the 
capitalist mode of production still forms the bulwark on which individuality rests. 
Expressions, then, of individualism, manifest as Fisher’s “alternative” or “independent” 
zones, are necessary extensions of the natural inclination to wrestle with the frenzied and 
oftentimes brutal march of progress. But the notion of “precorporation,” however, that 
which Fisher claims is the “pre-emptive” formatting of aspirations, hopes and cultural 
contestation, sounds a tiny bit like sour grapes. Certainly, the speed with which the 
process of incorporation transpires is faster than ever before, but to say that contemporary 
expressions of opposition are “merely” styles that borrow from antecedent gestures of 
rebellion is to indict all countercultural movements and productions. This is not some 
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esoteric claim. Popular author and ex-Rolling Stone contributor Greil Marcus charts 
antinomian discontent from punk rock to the Situationist International to modernist avant 
gardes to anabaptism in Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century. He 
may not be entirely convincing in positing some cabalistic through-line linking all these 
movements, but the broader point that culture is derivative stands. To think otherwise is 
to invoke some magical cultural production, created ex nihilo by the dark thaumaturgy of 
the most dangerous subculture yet: wizards. It is the reserve of the middle-aged and 
elderly to discount everything as having been “done before.” This would probably come 
as a surprise to youth culture, forever fomenting new countercultural strategies, 
deportment and practices out of anterior ones. What Fisher is critiquing is not, in my 
mind, the problem. Under different cultural coordinates, the fact that a good idea 
becomes commonplace would not be cause for lament (or, conversely, if it were a “bad” 
idea or behaviour, resultant from an exploitative social matrix, in ideal living conditions, 
it would be rejected). It is the competitive nature of invidious comparison that renders 
behaviours and gestures of individualism toxic, within “exchange-value” culture. The 
parvenus signals the trivialization of secret emancipatory creeds and hermetic resistance 
to older members of the tribe. When everyone is an initiate, the value of subterranean 
truths, the hook on which oppositional individualism is hung, appear commonplace. This 
is what troubles the odd, manufactured space between appearance and reality -- between 
how something seems and what it actually is. In short, individualism telegraphs its 
bearer’s sincerity or authenticity.
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  In Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling points to the fact that, like 
individualism itself, sincerity is born in a modern world: “...we cannot say of the 
patriarch Abraham that he was a sincere man. That statement must seem only comical. 
The sincerity of Achilles or Beowulf cannot be discussed: they neither have nor lack 
sincerity” (4). Trilling is interested in teasing out the matter of fidelity to self and the 
tricky nature of artifice, and he grants that authenticity as we know it emerges out of the 
painful transition from feudalism (21-21). I do not want to dally with authenticity’s tricky 
relationship with presentation and subterfuge. Rather, I want to exploit its ambiguity so as 
to encompass the sundry factors which swirl about the convoluted nexus where alterity 
appears to be domiciled. If an apt metaphor for modern development is Faustian, I 
volunteer the notion that authenticity, which, as an epiphenomenon of capitalist 
modernity itself, rising in tandem with individualism as its handmaiden and barometer, be 
dubbed “Lokiist.” 
 Loki, that singular deity of the Norse pantheon, is the god of trickery and 
mischief. Some mythologists consider Loki the brother of Odin, highest god in the Norse 
Pantheon, but as the Norse saga progresses, Loki takes on a malevolent cast and, indeed, 
is heavily implicated in Ragnarok, Norse mythology’s armageddon (Guerber 198). Loki 
prefigures the contradictions at the heart of modernity, being both seducer and deceiver. 
An entity of motion, of passion, of the circulation of the blood, he represents fire and the 
flux of life while simultaneously confounding the living with betrayals and scheming 
stratagems (Guerber 199). In one of his capers, he brings the force of time to the 
immortal refuge of the gods, breaching the wall between two worlds, transgressing 
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boundaries, and becoming what Lewis Hyde calls, “the creator of [...] threatening 
contingency” (Trickster 97). 
 Loki therefore adroitly emblematizes the complex raft of elements of 
contemporary authenticity. What I am calling the Lokiist-authentic transposes the 
connotations of the authentic into the slippery capriciousness of exchange-value culture 
and the self-estrangement therein. There is almost a concision in the suggestive powers 
evoked by Loki: fire, productivity, intentional mischief and contingency. This last item is 
important as it points to the manner in which coordinates of “the authentic” move. It is 
not that 1950s man is not interested in distinction any less than his 60s progeny. It’s just 
the affectations that change. Retrospect demonstrates that Robert Plant’s Adonis 
pretensions are no less mannered than Johnny Cash’s stoic, cowboy footsoldier for god, 
strung out on speed. Or to put it another, equally contrastive way, Yves Klein’s cool 
fashion mensch persona is about as far as you can get from the sutured face and scourged 
flesh of Viennese Actionist Günter Brus. The Lokiist-authentic is that which is shored up 
as invidious predation, empowered by the General Intellect and, finally, given a sheen of 
weight and significance by the abyss-artistry-redeemer compact. 
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Chapter 3
Authenticity Jumps the Shark & Concerned Abyss-Redeemers tune-in to all 
Its Reruns
Commodification provides options for cultural 
and artistic producers. [...] This ability for 
creative producers to use culture to produce 
diverse types of creativity also establishes 
interdependent relationships across industries, 
for collaboration, resources, commodification, 
and certification of their creativity.
-- Elizabeth Currid, The Warhol Economy, 2007, 
empahsis added
The work of imagination as a “space of 
contestation” plays a fundamental role in the 
agency of TM, whose work often consists of 
creative, short-live interventions that trouble 
commonly held beliefs about art, politics, and 
every day life.
-- Alessandra Renzi, “The Space of Tactical Media,” 
2008
Can business help render authenticity in a world 
where reality itself seems socially constructed? 
Certainly. But it means intentionally offsetting 
the lost sense of objective reality thrust on us by 
postmodernists with an understanding of 
difference between what is real and what we 
perceive to be real.
-- James Gilmore & B. Joseph Pine III, 
What Consumers Really Want: Authenticity, 2007
A. Authenticity fully Transmogrifies into its Lokiist variant and We all have a 
            Chuckle or Two
 A sure signal that authenticity is, in fact, manifest as Lokiist, is the mushrooming 
interest of capital in tapping its productive and desirable aspects. A quick examination of 
some recent business literature makes explicit what denizens of the counterculture prefer 
to perceive as a sly and covert sentiment and spirit, resultant from their discerning 
rejection of the status quo lifeworld. James Gilmore and Jospeh Pine’s What Consumer’s 
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Really Want: Authenticity (published by Harvard Business School Press) discusses 
authenticity as “the new business imperative” (1). The dust jacket promises to divulge the 
secret coordinates of the authentic to aspiring entrepreneurs: “It’s a paradox of today’s 
Experience Economy: the more contrived the world seems, the more we all demand 
what’s real. As reality is qualified, altered, and commercialized, consumer’s respond to 
what is engaging, personal, memorable -- and above all, authentic. If customers don’t 
view your offerings as real, you’ll be branded inauthentic -- fake! -- and risk losing 
sales.” The Soul of the New Consumer: Authenticity, What we Buy and Why in the New 
Economy by David Lewis and Darren Bridger carries this reassuring tag on its back: 
“Win the attention, time and trust of new consumers by giving their souls control.” 
Profits can be made while consumers’ souls are given license to finally have their say; it’s 
a win win situation. Rohit Bhargava highlights a central motif of his triumphant business 
acumen with the highlighted statement, placed prominently in the middle of the page, in 
Personality not Included: Why Companies Lose their Authenticity - And How Great 
Brands get it Back, “Personality is the unique, authentic, and talkable soul of your brand 
that people can get passionate about” (6). Further, this literature is not written in a 
Machiavellian register -- like the advertising literature coincident with the social reality 
of the 60s, eager to shuck the dreary and ossifying conservatism of “rules” and 
“conformity,” business literature about authenticity seeks to capitalize on the burgeoning 
desire for genuine objects and experiences so as to harmonize with the exciting upturn in 
appetites for the authentic. It genuinely wants in on the action, which it appears to 
perceive as mutually liberating for both entrepreneur and consumer. 
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 This development is the natural evolution in the commodification of “experience,” 
which began to make its presence felt, in business literature, about a decade ago. 
Although the language used is occasionally sinister, it is, perhaps unsurprisingly, given 
capital’s happy accommodation of perpetual flux, seemingly earnest in its zeal for 
capitalizing on new frontiers in human development and behaviour. Jeremy Rifkin 
discusses the somewhat astonishing business term “Lifetime Value” (LTV) in 2000’s The 
Age of Access: How the Shift from Ownership to Access is Transforming Capitalism:
The top fifth of the world’s population now spends almost as much of its 
income accessing cultural experiences as on buying manufactured goods 
and basic services. We are making the transition into what economists call 
an “experience economy” -- a world in which each person’s own life 
becomes, in effect, a commercial market. In business circles, the new 
operative term is “Lifetime Value” (LTV) of the customer, the theoretical 
measure of how much a human being is worth if every moment of his or 
her life were to be commodified in one form or another in the commercial 
sphere. In the new era, people purchase their very existence in small 
commercial segments. (7-8)
It is difficult to not see how this state of affairs is attached to the ascension of the General 
Intellect: social life exists at the level of productive logics, which transpose life 
experience into the public arena created by “networks of living cognitive labor.” 
Commodified “experience” is predicated on “access,” which is simply a metaphor for 
being “plugged in.” 
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 What the business literature misses, of course, is that the exciting ascension of 
experience economies and the seeming ability of capitalists to make their marketing 
cohere with the “soulful” authenticity of their consumer’s desires does not attest to 
liberation in the circuit of production, but rather the opposite. The estrangement built-in 
to commodity fetishism works double time under the conditions of the General Intellect: 
the psychosocial reconfiguration wrought by sociality belonging to the productivity of 
abstract knowledge and machinic assemblages means that estrangement exists at the level 
of deliberation and debate, the very level which (however falsely) used to promise relief, 
or at least a modicum of agency, in a commodified lifeworld. Therefore the uptick in 
business writing on authenticity is symptomatic of a real yearning for authenticity 
resultant from the very alienation wrought by the enterprise of commodified experience. 
This is the Lokiist-authentic, here manifest as the natural outgrowth of the rebel 
consumerism of the 60s. It is a rational desire for restless assertions of the singularity of 
self and arguably helps account for the oddly desperate reiterative self-affirmation that 
comprises the twitter-scape and social media environs, wherein manifest striving for 
Lokiist-authenticity plays out as invidious comparison of digital selfhood seemingly 
gauged by incessant activity. This activity is comprised of personal observances, which 
double as bids for recognition, creating an ever-increasing profusion (“I have 800 
facebook friends, hardwired to my “wall” updates, which are routed through my twitter 
account, where I enjoy the attention of 900 followers!”).  
 It also accounts for the further boostering and slight refiguring of abyss-artistry 
and -redemption. Abyss-redemption, remember, thrives on playing accomplice to the 
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liberal sphere’s injunction to celebrate and explicate transgression (so as to cover for its 
simultaneous toleration of inequality). The abyss-redeemer resides in the “saving office 
of the commentator, the critic who can interpret [...] irony’s social value” (Durham Peters 
7). This relationship is still easy to see in, say, such productions as British author Tom 
McCarthy’s neo-avant-gardist collective, International Necronautical Society (INS),35 
which takes the self-reflexivity of the modernist avant-gardes to enigmatic and knowing 
heights of ironic and tongue-in-cheek bravado. Announcing themselves via a manifesto 
published in the advertising section of the London Times,36 the INS enjoys a mock-
serious playfulness, wherein the participants endow themselves with sobriquets echoing 
the offices of communist regimes and the earnestness of the early avant-garde 
movements. McCarthy himself is “General Secretary.” Simon Crtichley is “Philosopher 
in Chief.” Anthony Auerbach is “Chief of Propaganda (Archiving and Epistemological 
Critique).” They have performed expulsions, again, evoking the famous 
excommunications of communist regimes and antecedent avant-garde movements. Their 
performance pieces, theoretical writings and manifestos are all stitched together by a 
commitment to oblivion, a gleeful embrace of thanatos, as a strategy of liberation from 
the impending demise of the world (hence the term “necronautic” in their name). Their 
work exploits the idea of networked art and literature, the post-structuralist “textual” 
author, and burgeoning technological possibilities. It is a heady brew and has attracted the 
90
35 See www.necronauts.org/index.htm
36 14 December 1999: The Times, London, p. 1.
attention of reams of abyss-redeemers.37 That abyss-redemption would find such 
offerings alluring is unsurprising. The INS is a pitch-perfect example of oppositional 
cultural production in the age of the General Intellect: Its insincerity, in marked contrast 
to its avant-garde predecessors, is a mark of its Lokiist-authenticity. Earnestness itself, 
under the conditions of the General Intellect, carry a demerit of guacheness. A 
transvaluation of what we commonly associate with sincerity is here enacted: 
authenticity, under Lokiist-authentic aesthetics, is not forthright; rather its inverted form 
of indirection is granted prestige. It is as if recognition of the public sphere’s absorption 
into the circuit of production itself spoils the game. Wry and oblique gestures carry the 
day and, indeed, do appear to exhibit a particular energy. The parodic and mocking is, 
after all, a register highly attuned to the caprices of artifice. Shorn of the seemingly 
fallow projects of the avant-garde of the traditional left, productions that have nothing to 
lose can harness an effervescence and verve that eludes the humourlessness of strident 
oppositional culture. Cultural resistance here learns to play the game. The game is rigged, 
it seems to say; let’s calm down and have a drink. The INS then is a match made in 
heaven for the abyss-artist-redeemer compact.
 Where abyss redemption is slightly reconfigured, however, is in the production of 
tactical media (discussed in Chapter 1). Where the INS may give us an example of 
oppositional production in the age of the General Intellect, TM is arguably the errant 
child of the General Intellect. But unlike capital’s authenticity mongers, it is critical of the 
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37 See “A Hearing on the Activities of the International Necronautical Society, with Tom McCarthy and 
Simon Critchley,” Cabinet Magazine. Sept 2010, <http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/events/mccarthy.php> 
and “Meeting the International Necronautical Society,” ForteanTimes, July 2002, <http://
www.forteantimes.com/features/articles/239/meeting_the_international_necronautical_society.html>
social conditions resultant from the productive logics of the General Intellect. It too, 
however, is a shepherd of the Lokiist-authentic, as we will see. Tactical media is the 
photographic negative of authenticity as a business -- it sees as liberatory the fact that its 
ontology and expression belong to, and are promulgated on the circuits of, the public 
sphere of networked capital. Harnessing this power in a bottom-up capacity, it maintains, 
allows for fire to be fought with fire. It is here that the explicitly political dimension of 
oppositional culture must be countenanced, for it is here that we see abyss-redemption at 
its most galling, lending invidious stock to otherwise etiolated cultural criticism in the 
wake of the failure of the New Left.
B. Tactical Media: “Alterity” Returns, Stronger and Faster than Ever Before 
 Upon a moment’s reflection, it is clear that invidious comparison drives cycles of 
consumption and so, counter the desires of its practitioners inclined to cultural resistance, 
it aids and abets consumer capitalism. In any large, urban center, this is painfully obvious, 
as “alt” trends have long ago passed the rubicon into mainstream acceptance and 
ubiquitousness. In the city where I reside, I have recently seen ads for Bulldog Vodka, in 
the form of small billboards on the walls of the subway system, that seem to emblematize 
the peculiar contradiction at the heart of commercial paeans to cultural obstreperousness. 
Blazoned beneath a portrait of a young, white James Dean lookalike, reads the tag: 
“Defiance Never Tasted so Good.” There is a collective suspension of disbelief at work in 
the reception of this ad. But, as the foregoing chapters attest, the conditions wherein such 
a dissonant image can be easily interpreted by an average viewer have been gestating for 
92
decades. This species of insight begins to border on prosaic. Even the most mainstream 
news sources now frequently comment on the self-evident fact that oppositional cultural 
production is popular cultural production.38 Where this selfsame tension is less visible, 
however, is in the update of the 1960s radical. I believe that Tactical Media perpetrates 
this gaffe. As discussed in Chapter 1, TM arose in a particular set of historical and 
political conditions. To reflect on the mechanisms whereby TM reiterates older 
oppositional maneuvers and the division of communicative labour which enables this 
state of affairs, it is necessary to quickly consider TM’s origins. 
 A recent article on Dissent magazine’s website39 posits the post-New Left 
existence of an “anti-intellectualism that manifested itself in a rejection of “grand 
narratives” and structural critiques of capitalism, abhorrence for the traditional forms of 
left-wing organization, a localist impulse, and an individualistic tendency to conflate 
lifestyle choices with political action.” This statement points to the enervation of the left 
resulting from the ascension of Thatcherism/Reaganism and the fall of “actually existing 
socialism.” The organizational strategies of the left changed dramatically in accord with 
the left’s marginalization in the 1980s. The left’s disillusionment with mass politics may 
be an old story, but the organizational (or disorganizing) processes this disillusionment 
wrought is often not charted properly. A key element is sometimes glossed over; that is, 
that the left’s continued struggle, which turned its focus to resistance in reception and 
quotidian defiances, in many ways simply recapitulated the tired cliche of personal 
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38 See “From Warhol to Murakami: pop art hasn't lost its soul, it's selling it,” The Guardian, 9 Feb 2012; 
“Diego Rivera at MoMA Makes Us Ask, What Happened to the Radical Left in Art?,” Huffington Post 
Blog, 18 Nov 2011.
39 Sunkara, Bhaskar. “The Anarcho-Liberal,” Dissent: Arguing the World. 27 Sept 2011.
politics. The standard charting of the left in retreat resides in the two-pronged explanation 
which saw 80s/90s activist circles delve further and further into a politics of individual 
“conscience” whilst the ivory tower became enamored of biopower, difference, identity 
politics and the location of agency in the act of reception. In both instances, micropolitics 
eclipsed macro. Concurrent with these changes in scholarly and activist circles was the 
rise of the internet and the advent of “globalization.” Both the internet, the technological 
scaffolding for the “global village,” and its substructure, globalizing logics, extended 
tremendous pressures on social formations the world over. The effect of these 
developments were, as they say, “game changers.” Globalization, the global triumph of 
liberal democracy and capitalism, twinned with technological apparatuses rendering 
communication instantaneous, had a profound double effect on the left: The end-of-
history narratives of globalization seemed so daunting as to throw avenues of resistance 
for a loop, while the networking enabled by the internet seemed to proffer the possibility 
of new collectivities, subjectivities and forms of resistance. But conceptions of the 
organizational possibilities engendered by the latter carried with them anxieties wrought 
by the former.
 Although the term “Tactical Media” may, in fact, be unfamiliar to some of its 
practitioners, its ethos and freight are in evidence in bookstores, classrooms, activist 
canteens, and artist co-ops. And doubly so a decade ago. The phenomenon arose in late 
80s/early 90s, unnamed, in the unholy union of techno-anarcho utopians (emblematized 
by the works of R. U. Sirius, the triumphalist techno-fetishist spirit of Mondo 2000, and 
the brashness of industrial avant-garde) and the ascendant mode of political pranking 
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dubbed “culture jamming” (Adbusters and anti-advertising/anti-consumerist sentiment). 
In both instances there is an enthusiasm for technology, tacticality, and autonomism. And 
again, in both instances micro-politics replace the macro. These were movements more 
preoccupied with stealth and speed than with the lumbering political processes of 
yesteryear. And there were antecedent cogitations with which these new forms of 
oppositional spirit could be traced and theorized. In particular, a chapter from Michel de 
Certeau’s The Practise of Everday Life, published in 1984, titled “‘Making Do’: Uses and 
Tactics” provided aspirant Tactical Media practitioners with theoretical flourishes and 
critical heft. Of particular interest was de Certeau’s distinction between “tactics” and 
strategies.” Divorced from de Certeau’s considerably dense text, the distinction between 
the two could be rendered thus: Tactics are the rapidly deployed practices of the guerilla, 
the immigrant, the powerless. They are the resort of the cultural consumer who has no 
place of her own. Strategies, meanwhile, are the domain of dominative institutional 
powers, of technical and scientific rationality. A key distinction here is that strategies 
enjoy dominion over a “propre,” which is best conceived of as a subordinating power 
over space (and time) (de Certeau xix). Tactics, then, are always making incursions into 
“strategically” dominated areas. There they can momentarily disrupt strategic plans and/
or carve out momentary autonomous space. Consequently, a tactical political project must 
be ephemeral. It must also think in terms of small units, not the large bodies, of, say, 
electoral politics. It is the sort of perspective which lends itself to concepts like Work 
Theft, of which de Certeau, indeed, is an advocate.
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 It is easy to see how the alluring schema applied to TM can overlay a multiplicity 
of activities and lend them a credibility they might not otherwise have. It is the sort of 
conception that can make activism and artistic protest fun (not such a bad thing!). It has 
sass. It has verve. And it appears to have allowed for the temporary disavowal of 
neoliberal global domination. TM interventions began to be understood as the 
oppositional form du jour. And why not? Tactical media is understood to be dynamic, 
playful, vigorous, colorful, and, perhaps most importantly, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
manifold. From Culture Jamming to internet and surveillance art to remix culture to 
internet activism, tactical media interventions, in their many forms, are understood to 
harness the power of prank, of jouissance, of a spirited subversion that promises to wake 
us modern myrmidons from the hebetude and subjugation of late capitalism. Whether de 
Certeau would consent to his work being marshaled in this way is debatable. In fact, it is 
fair to say that the most we could likely pull out of de Certeau’s writings before willfully 
misreading him is a conception of resistance as anodyne, not as a prescription for a 
countercultural compass, a political movement or the underwriting of the activist 
playbook. And it should go without saying that I am not suggesting some monocausal 
explanation for the anemia of the left with de Certeau as the loadstar. But, whether 
retroactively or not, The Practise of Everday Life serves as a kind of urtext for tacticality. 
And, as we can now see, features of tacticality informed much of the political project of 
the 90s; above all, the penchant for provisionality and subversion. Moreover, it was the 
object around which an entire industry of abyss-redemption was centred. It is worth 
thumbing through any old Adbusters from around this time to throw this fact into sharp 
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relief. Calls to become “meme warriors” and “anti-branding activists” are interwoven 
with discussions of “mind pollution,” “guerrilla semiotics” and discussions of the power 
of partying for such endgames as temporary reclamation of public space. It is not that 
these strategems and concerns are worthless. The problem is that tacticality recasts what 
should be means into ends. In retrospect, it seems like what happened was that the least 
effective part of the 60s American variant of the New Left, i.e., its lifestyle-as-politics, 
get-your-freak-on individualism, was reanimated and divorced from its more effective 
elements, i.e., galvanizing vast swaths of the population to engage with, and activate on 
behalf of, goals set by the likes of the Civil Rights Movement and the feminist 
movement.
 The persistence of 60s individualism seems curious. Most other facets of 
countercultural currents of the 60s appear hopelessly dated. However, if, as the foregoing 
has repeatedly stressed, invidious comparison often comes to bear on expressions of 
alterity and emancipatory projects, then the through-line between 60s individualism and 
TM makes more sense. There are few territories less fecund than the 1960s for fealty to 
individuation as a political act. Moreover, its reanimation is covered by its refraction 
through the economic reality of contemporary capitalism. When TM is perceived of as a 
part and parcel of neoliberalism itself, that is, as a sort of dialectical double, its endurance 
makes more sense. Tactical Media’s “nomadic agency” does, it so happens, mirror the 
neoliberal project, which is characterized by “extreme dynamism, mobility of practice, 
responsiveness to contingencies and strategic entanglements with politics” (Ong 3).
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C. The General Intellect and “Post-National” Politics
 TM’s artful guile, then, is not unreasonably thought to be the only feasible counter 
to the ambulatory ubiquity of neoliberalism. It carries with it nothing of the bulky, party-
based structures of the old left. And furthermore, it facilitates greater digital interplay and 
so cashes in on already extant enthusiasm for electronic linkage, global counterculture 
and “networking” writ large. Jeffrey Juris, who was “embedded” for years with anti-
globalization activists, and whose writing champions networked activism, explicitly 
demarcates tactical organization from the dreary plodding of the old left:
While the command-oriented logic of leftist parties and unions is based on 
recruiting new members, developing unified strategies, political 
representation through vertical structures, and the pursuit of political 
hegemony, networked-based politics involve the creation of broad 
umbrella spaces, where diverse organizations, collectives, and networks 
converge around common hallmarks, while preserving their autonomy and 
specificity. (199)
Geographical distance was no obstacle to the growing digital networks that began to 
proclaim a new politics of “rhizomatic” and horizontally organized multitudes. For these 
reasons, TM was marshaled in many different quarters and its ethos was thought to 
underwrite the disparate and multitudinous elements of (a perhaps self-styled) global civil 
society. Indeed, the case has been made that the Seattle protests themselves qualify as an 
example of Tactical Media due to their “hit-and-run” mobility, flexibility, and improvised 
and collective coordination (Bruns 85). But this civil society, a stamp of the public sphere 
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in late capitalism, belongs more to the productive logics of the General Intellect than it 
does to traditional conceptions of the liberal public sphere. The “movement of 
movements” as the most visible purveyors of TM are often called -- i.e., the “anti-
globalization movement” -- enact, at their best, vibrant clarion calls for systemic change 
and collective emancipation. At their worst, however, they are expressions of invidious 
comparison, predicated on invocations of the Lokiist-authentic. (They are, in either case, 
expressions of their age). Their tendency to eschew common platform out of respect for 
multifarious nonconformity is a notion of freedom borrowed from marketplace 
liberalism’s conception of atomised social fabrics and enshrined in digital culture. 
Needless to say, the aftermath of the “anti-globalization” demonstrations — to say 
nothing of the anti-Iraq war protests of 2003, which constituted the largest 
demonstrations in the history of the world — was decidedly anti-climatic.
 Because TM’s allure is located in its dynamism and seemingly limitless potential 
it carries with it anxieties, manifest in its own organizational forms, which forecloses on 
its efficacy:
behind the appealing lightness and optimism of TM looms real ‘end of 
history’ despair about the failure of past revolutionary struggles and 
experiments and the impossibility of any ‘outside’ to capitalism. In a 
world without heroic visions or alternatives, the art of everyday resistance 
seemed preferable to the methodological work of building sustained 
opposition only to wind up with a new boss, the same as the old boss. 
(Ray & Sholette 520).
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Unfortunately, TM’s rejection of the hoary organizing strictures and appeals to grand 
narratives of the old left, while allowing for micro-political experimentation and 
versatility, coincide with a “corporate climate that [celebrates] dis-organising the 
organisation and thinking outside the box, two managerial mantras of neoliberal 
enterprise culture” (Ray & Sholette 521). But it can hardly be any other way; the very 
traits that mark late capitalism -- the profusion of “choice,” the primacy afforded 
individuation -- work to amplify the conditions from which invidious comparison is most 
fertile.
 Discussing the political force wielded by anti-globalization activism, political 
scientist David Chandler points to the presence of “post-territorial” politics. This 
phenomenon is easy to understand: the opposition to globalizing economic trends 
necessitated solidarity amongst communities across state borders, just as it contributed to 
the dismantling of faith in representational politics. This, too, is a reconfiguration of 
social bonds resulting from the networking of the General Intellect, which replaces the 
imaginary bonds belonging to enclaves such as the nation-state and repositions them in 
the circuit of production. Chandler claims, “territorial state-based politics is held to 
institutionalize the structuring of grand narratives of ‘the nation’ and to universalize 
particularist and narrow interests on the basis of those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the territorial 
boundary” (Possibilities, 116). This facilitates a comprehension of politics whereby it is 
not understood to be “mediated through the divisive institutions of territorial 
communities, [but rather] the individual can engage directly in the ‘politics of the 
human,’ in the ‘global civil society,’ or in the struggle against ‘power’ or 
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‘empire’” (Possibilities, Chandler 116). Chandler notes that these developments have had 
a profound effect on the way that politics are mobilized:
the decline of territorial political community does not appear to have led to 
new forms of political community (in territorial or post-territorial forms), 
but rather to the individuation of ‘being’ political. Therefore ‘being 
political’ today takes the form of individuated ethical activity in the same 
way as ‘being religious’ takes a highly personal form with the rejection of 
organized churches. Being religious and being political are both 
statements of individual differentiation rather than reflections of social 
practices and ways of life. (Possibilities,118)
‘Being political’ allows for ones’ personal manner, comportment, stance to mark ones’ 
discernment and status. It is a bushelful of invidious Lokiist-authenticity and an operative 
component of most TM enterprise. Again, we see the transmission of 60s radicalism 
expressed under a different set of cultural constellations. Chandler charts this evolution:
The radical struggle [against traditional political engagement] was shaped 
by a rejection of the conservative politics of the organized left; particularly 
in France, where the left (including the Communist Party) supported the 
war in Algeria, discrediting its claim of representing universal interests. 
However, rather than dispute the claims of the old left to represent a 
collective political subject, the new left rejected the existence of collective 
political interests per se. The resulted, by default, in either a reduction of 
emancipatory claims to the ‘self-realization’ of the individual [...] or in the 
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search for subaltern subjects on the margins of society. Instead of the 
construction of new collectivities, radical consciousness was dominated by  
a critical approach to organization, a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ which 
derided mass politics and inevitably reduced political aspirations. (Below, 
321)
  The despair of the post-New Left is almost palpable. However, the abyss-
redemption lending the modus operandi of TM a sheen of utility and power is fully 
understandable. There appeared to be few places from which to buttress a program of 
resistance. Rather than retreating, regrouping, and rallying a new charge, post-New Left 
abyss-redeemers forged ahead with the materials they were given. That is, the 
productions of the General Intellect. This stands to reason: there were fêtes to attend, 
departmental soirees at which to be seen; places at which something had to be said to 
exhibit ones’ cultural sophistication. Consequently, respite was located in the self and in 
the symbolic gestures belonging to a networked public space.40 Symbolic politics, 
Chandler claims, are “highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of ‘raising 
awareness’ [...] Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretense of taking 
responsibility for engaging with the world — the act is [imagined to be] ethical in 
itself” (Possibilities, 117). Further, “raising awareness” presupposes a secret knowledge 
on the part of the awareness raiser. It becomes a form of cultural capital. And it is as 
nebulous an injunction of emancipation as the popular 1960s shibboleth, “free your 
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40 The Facebook “Like” button is a painfully apt case in point. 
mind.” It is, at its worst, simply a line demarcating its agents from the tranquilized herds 
of mass society. 
 The central problem with the methodology of TM, then, is its ambiguous 
relationship to the political. Its repeatedly foils its own purported aim of resistance. 
Chandler, parsing social movements theorist, Alberto Melucci, throws this quandary into 
sharp relief in a single paragraph:
[Mulucci notes that] ‘A new political space is designed beyond the 
traditional distinction between state and “civil society:” an intermediate 
public space, whose function is not to institutionalize the movements or to 
transform them into parties, but to make society hear their messages… 
while the movements maintain their autonomy.’ This ambiguity is the key 
to the ‘bottom-up’ ethics of global civil society, understood as a space 
whereby political movements can make their claims but also maintain 
their difference and specificity. They become ‘visible’ but are not 
institutionalized; that is they do not have to make claims to legitimacy 
based on electoral or financial support. This, in Melucci’s words, is the 
‘democracy of everyday life,’ where legitimacy and recognition stem from 
‘mere existence’ rather than the power of argument or 
representation.’ (Below, 321)
This must be why Jeffrey Juris, discussing the “open network model,” writes, with 
unabashed candor, that “collective decisions [are] restricted as much as possible to 
technical coordination as opposed to abstract political debates, allowing diverse actors to 
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organize within a common platform” (198). Heaven forbid that political debates come to 
bear on an explicitly political operations like, say, battling inequity or combating the 
allegedly popular foe of culture jammers everywhere, the Washington Consensus. 
D. Culture Jammin’: Rising above the Crowd
 Underpinning all the considerations heretofore is the running acknowledgement 
that cultural constellations do not emerge in a vacuum; that there are historical conditions 
which underwrite their development. In The Emancipated Spectator, Jacques Rancière 
repeatedly points out that, although cultural production can highlight how society can be 
remade by allowing the imagining of possibility, outside of a substantial political 
narrative that can act as bondsman or lend potential surety to such speculations, it 
becomes deeply troubled. In the absence of a robust left, cultural resistance has embraced 
a recapitulation of solipsistic alterity, a “resistant” individuation as a form of cultural 
defiance. On an individual level, it is eminently rational, empowering and vivacious. On 
a social level, it is toxic, divisive and a pitch-perfect rendering of the zero-sum game 
which attends cycles of invidious comparison. 
 “101 Tricks to Play on the Mainstream,” by Tom Liacas, consists of intermittent 
interviews with self-identified “culture jammers.” The seemingly unconscious elitism of 
the interviewees is striking. “After culture jamming,” one of them claims, “you can’t go 
back to being a consumer, grumbling about [corporate] offerings. You’ve become an 
addicted cultural producer that meets in bars every week with a like-minded gang of 
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malcontents. Your creations are pranks, public art projects, and guerrilla communications 
campaigns. You’ve never felt so powerful, productive and alive” (67). 
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Chapter 4
Conclusion: Human Stink and Solidarity in a Networked World
 Terry Eagleton has written that "the freedom of the text or language [has] come to 
compensate for the unfreedom of the system as a whole" (Postmodernists, 
64). Meanwhile, Jim McGuigan has written that "'cool capitalism' is largely defined by 
the incorporation, and theory neutralization, of cultural criticism and anti-capitalism into 
the theory and practice of capitalism itself" (38).  These two quotes together account for 
the most burdensome reading of the power of commodification: On the one hand we have 
the false freedom of micropolitical gymnastics in the arena of discourse and/or acts of 
clever signification, while on the other hand we see even these ostensible acts of dissent 
rendered anemic by a neoliberal subjugation only too happy to collaborate or colonize 
defiance. If one belabors these considerations one is frozen by crippling cynicism; 
conversely, one ignores these concerns at one's peril. But, of course, the former can 
subsume the latter. I feel, therefore, that I should make the claim here that, wherever the 
foregoing has seemed derisive or cynical, it is not because I harbour contempt for 
impulses that underlie forms of alterity. I wholly agree with Critical Arts Ensemble 
member, Steve Kurtz, when he claims that
those elements of society that were once considered superstructural 
abstractions of the economy that didn’t matter, actually do matter. They 
have causal impact in determining how we live, how we behave, and what 
the structure of society will be in general. So culture becomes an 
additional major battlefront. How is culture going to be constructed? 
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Struggles in representation are as significant as struggles for the factories. 
Today, in [the] globally developed technosphere, more so than ever. (qtd in 
Critical Strategies)
It is precisely because I feel that the impulses that animate attempts to instantiate alterity 
are so very important that I am of the opinion that critical interrogation of alterity is a 
necessary component of its health. Which is to say that the search for alterity has a 
political dimension. Although I do not broach this facet of alternative media’s character 
until the very last chapter, I hope that this is a discernible thread running throughout all 
the preceding chapters. Although the foregoing is not a historical charting of alternative 
media and alterity through the evolution of modernity, I have taken care to show, where 
possible, that the public sphere, wherein gestures of alterity are enacted, emerges from 
and evolves (or mutates) in, capitalist modernity. 
 The problem with alternative media or alterity’s political dimension is that in its 
rational desire to simultaneously engage and evade domination it arrives in a no man’s 
land from which it does not seem to discern itself clearly. Although I have been at pains 
to demonstrate this double-bind in the foregoing, it may not be so self-evident as I 
presuppose. Therefore, I will quickly sketch the movements and motions of alterity that I 
have attempted to uncover. Because this is easier to see in the instance of strictly artistic 
practice, my example will refer, counter to my mandate in the foregoing, to alternative 
media’s explicitly artistic variants.
 The prominence of the translation of act into word -- the ubiquity of critical art's 
contemporary textual self-explication --  i.e., the collapsing of artist and spectator-critic, 
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stem from the fact that the public sphere, that in which all artistic interventions are 
effected, is neither solely rational or discursive, but, as Durham Peters terms it, dependent 
on the separation of powers between "performance and criticism, action and commentary, 
drama and critique” (92).  That is, abyss-artistry and -redemption. Performance, action 
and drama might not be wholly reducible to verbal reason, but because politically-
engaged art usually does demand a modicum of communicative rationality, some 
signposts are provided by a work's creator. But the "criticism, commentary and critique" 
of the artist is always executed in half-measures. The liberal public sphere, domain of 
absolute freedom of expression, that space which underwrites the dialectic of refusal and 
incorporation, as discussed above, also maintains a long tradition of avoiding the 
cognates of the hearth, of the personal. This tension creates an uncertainty which allows 
for the implicit and the balancing act of indirect commentary and irony, the two most 
popular modes of oppositional interventions. What I am getting at here is the question of 
whether or not contemporary oppositional art makes a double-claim. The old Romantic 
preoccupation with "inspiration" is perhaps as present as ever, despite appearances to the 
contrary. Inspiration is simply an emblem of authenticity and it is still understood to be 
bound up with the problem of self-regard and the possibility of eluding self-
consciousness (i.e., avoiding being interrupted by the "man from Porlock"). 
Extemporaneity in the act of creation is understood as "genuine." The use of artistic 
practice then -- even in those instances where the practice of explanatory cues are absent 
-- makes claim to the effectiveness of its interventions on the shoulders of its awareness 
that it is best, in the moment of creation, to eschew self-awareness. That is to say that 
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much oppositional art can be thought to sneak a rational-critical critique into the public 
sphere within the trojan horse of artistic creation, by virtue of the fact that creative 
enterprise carries with it the "authentic" aura of artistic creation. So even when a work is 
seemingly calculated, planned (and sometimes deliberately duplicitous) -- as with a work 
which might be involved in hailing the "over-identification" of its spectator -- it is 
still encoded in an authentic form. This is what "brings it market" in the first instance; it 
is the reason its appearance in the public sphere is attended by aplomb and poise and 
demands a particular sort of reception. (Though this is also due to the work of the abyss-
redeemer, whom I will address momentarily).
 But why would one desire to avoid self-consciousness? What does “self-
consciousness” represent that is antithetical to understandings of authenticity? It is 
because self-consciousness is deliberate and premeditated that it is aware of its 
complicity with exchange-value culture. It comprises the waking, conscious self that 
wakes up and brushes its teeth within the oppressive matrix of capitalist modernity. It is 
the rationalism belonging to behaviour in and of the public sphere. Extemporaneity, 
meanwhile, seems to proffer a momentary evasion of cultural strictures. It is authenticity 
by another name. Moreover, the objects of its manufacture can be utilized so as to signal 
the evasion instanced in the moment of their creation. This maneuver is a point of egress 
into a cycle of invidious comparison. We can now back up a tiny bit and return to the 
above paragraph. In place of “critical art” we can substitute “alterity” (or “abyss-
artistry”). No matter what the species of alterity one cares to mention, I would argue that 
this structure is at play in some capacity. Some accessory, article, comportment or attitude 
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-- generated via a connection to the authentic -- is conscripted in expressions of alterity to 
telegraph its wearer’s evasion of the mendacity of modernity. (Again, it is from this 
launching point that cycles of invidious comparison ebb and flow, a sequence marked by 
the presence of the arriviste).
 I believe that although anxiety about "authenticity" is perhaps considered a hoary 
problematic and only apt in arenas where questions of "selling out" might be a concern, it 
is actually still deeply relevant to oppositional culture. I think it is a mistake to only 
consider "authentic" and "ersatz" being coordinates for "popular" forms of creative 
endeavor. We recognize that the desire for the authentic is a factor in the massive upswing 
of the creative economies of the neoliberal era and that it is a huge component of the 
Veblenian boom and bust cycle in the marketplace of rebellion (the countercultural ebbs 
and flows typified by Beat, Hippie, Mod, Punk, Hip Hop, etc). But there is less attention 
paid to the issues of authenticity at play in the (oftentimes) rarefied milieu of abyss-
redemption itself.
 A strong feature of Veblen’s conception of invidious comparison belonging to a 
culture of predation is that it quite effortlessly encompasses the critic. Although I believe 
that status hierarchy is understood to be a tacit given in the arena of cultural mandarins, 
literary criticism, the ivory tower, etc., it is rarely given quite so unabashed a drubbing as 
it is through the prism of invidious predation. Not only is this satisfying (to my mind), it 
is also a relay to the activity of the abyss-redeemer, whose seemingly objective and 
professional impartiality is actually anything but. There is a thread that runs throughout 
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the foregoing which attempts to point to the communicative labour which lends credence 
to acts of transgression and alterity. 
 The abyss-redeemer is the semi-autonomous agent of the public sphere. S/he works 
to further perpetuate a liberal conception of freedom, which, as discussed above, happily 
accommodates the free speech attendant to the “marketplace of ideas.” With surgeon’s 
gloves and rational reserve, s/he faithfully unpacks the feral and tempestuous products of 
abyss-artistry (and its cognate of alternative media). That this endeavour belongs to 
cycles of invidious comparison is a rather unequivocal truism; the vaingloriousness and 
backbiting of, say, the professoriat needs no preamble. But the trait of this occupation that 
is perhaps not so obvious and that I have attempted to bring to the fore is the odd 
complicity of the abyss-redeemer with market liberalism and the promulgation of alterity 
(although, it must be said, the two are far from mutually exclusive!). The abyss-redeemer 
occupies a peculiar intersection wherein s/he fulfills intended and unintended functions. 
Apparatchik of a program of publicity which reinscribes liberal notions of freedom, 
predicated on a faux meritocracy, s/he is the agent which brings alterity to market. 
Simultaneously, her or his dalliance with miscreants of alterity is not a contrivance; her or 
his attraction to actus reus is genuine. It is precisely because of her or his office as 
translator and doorkeeper to the public sphere, that which recoups his or her ministrations 
in the role of abyss-redeemer as commodified product, that s/he feels that s/he can 
transfigure transgression into socially beneficent nostrums. Further, this conduct points to 
a desire for the authentic on the part of the abyss-redeemer herself. It is the carrot that 
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makes delving into the opprobrious world of alterity and the abyss-artist worthwhile. It is 
the desire for an antidote to the estrangement of exchange-value culture.
 But authenticity, in the final analysis, is chimerical. It is not a lie, necessarily, but 
it is an alibi. It is quicksilver. As discussed above, it emerges in tandem with the “tragedy 
of modernity.” It is a moving target, metamorphosing with capitalist modernity itself. And 
it becomes ever more elusive under the coordinates of the General Intellect, where, public 
commons collapsed into productive logics, the rationalizations and legitimations of the 
abyss-redeemer become ever more suspect. Authenticity, in such an environment, 
becomes what I have called Lokiist.
 This appears to be a reiteration of yet another totalizing and cynical impasse; there 
is no evasion of a system which recoups maneuvers of dissent. It forcefully echoes the 
objections mounted by Walter Benn Michaels and Stephen Knapp in “Against Theory,” 
noted by Frederic Jameson as 
the dilemma of getting out of [a] total system [...] whether the market and 
capitalism, or the American character and exceptional experience 
(American culture) -- the power with which the system is theorized 
outsmarts the local act of judging or resisting it from within, revealing that 
to have been another feature of the system itself, whether ruse or incest 
taboo, programmed into it in advance. (204)
However, as Jameson observes, even “total” systems change. Rather than imagining ways 
in which to “step outside” the system, our attention is better paid to the ways in which the 
future is already present within our historical moment and the ways in which the 
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materials of the present can come to bear on the future. This, of course, repeats Marx’s oft  
quoted obstetric metaphor of social change, which I discussed briefly in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, as Jameson puts it, an opposite conclusion than one that admits of futility can 
be drawn:
critiques of consumption and commodification can only be truly radical 
when they specifically include reflection, not merely on the problem of the 
market itself, but above all, on the nature of socialism as an alternative 
system. Unless the possibility of such an alternate system is grappled with 
an theorized explicitly, then I would agree that the critique of 
commodification tends fatally to turn back into a merely moral discussion, 
into mere Kulturkritik in the bad sense and a matter of 
“handwringing.” (207)
In the absence of a platform that can play bondsman to the imaginings and longings 
contained in alterity’s gestures, it rapidly becomes enfeebled. Further, it effortlessly 
manifests the zero-sum game of invidious comparison. But this “alternate system” of 
socialism that Jameson invokes is strategy by another name. That the ascension of TM 
has put the binary of tactics vs strategies in the limelight is cause for reflection. And, as 
noted above, it appears as though TM as it has been deployed in the shadow of the failure 
of the New Left is, as I write, undergoing a substantial metamorphosis. The development 
of OWS may simply be a footnote in the history of the twenty-first century. But it is 
nonetheless bringing conceptions of economic rights, subjectivity, collectivity and 
political change into a new light. Moreover, it is doing so within the coordinates of the 
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General Intellect. That this may beneficially reconfigure notions of alterity (and 
authenticity!) is not too remote a possibility.
 The abyss-artist, architect of alternative media, makes attempts at trying to sneak 
emotionality and human stink into the stoic rational-critical arena of the liberal public 
sphere. This in and of itself is admirable and worthy of approbation. Odorousness is an 
equalizing agent. It contains an incipient inkling that humankind is a communal being, 
that the human estate need not be fragmentized. Alterity’s rejection of oppressive 
strictures contains embryonic aspirations of inclusivity. But its deployment does not. So 
long as dissent and cultural resistance are expressed through gestures of alterity, which 
are burnished by the abyss-redemptive recapitulation of the logics of liberal publicity, 
wherein society is an aggregate of atomised selves, whose motive force is competition, an 
action which renders said gestures markers of distinction, the emancipation desired by 
alterity will be undercut by its own movements. 
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